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Introduction 
 The American criminal justice system is heavily influenced by racist and classist 
attitudes, relies on punishment rather than rehabilitation, and has done little to reduce the 
commission of crimes. One of the most defective aspects of this justice system is the death 
penalty, a punishment which is still imposed in the United States despite the fact that only five 
Western nations continue to apply it.1 As I find the death penalty to be an immoral, ineffective 
punishment, I believe that it should be eradicated in the United States. In order to argue for the 
abolition of the death penalty, it is necessary to examine the political theory which defends or 
critiques the punishment. These theories include both philosophical arguments examining the 
death penalty in terms of justice and deterrence, and context-dependent analyses which evaluate 
punishment based upon its actual practice.  
Although these theories provide a basis for critiquing and reexamining the American 
death penalty, the Supreme Court of the United States determines whether punishments are 
constitutional based upon the Eighth Amendment, and therefore eradicating the use of the death 
penalty in the United States will be decided by the Court. In this thesis, I will evaluate the major 
theories underpinning the American death penalty, and then analyze their intersections with 
Supreme Court jurisprudence in order to determine the Court’s theoretical view of capital 
punishment and whether it is consistent. By revealing this theoretical framework, I will be able 
to determine which theories may be dispositive in a Supreme Court ruling abolishing capital 
punishment in all circumstances.   
The first chapter of this thesis discusses theories based upon the role of capital 
punishment in establishing justice. In this chapter, I will discuss the theories of Immanuel Kant 
                                                
1 David M. O’Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics, Volume Two: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 7th ed. (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 1172.  
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and G.W.F. Hegel, who argue that adherence to the lex talionis, or the principle that punishment 
should be proportionate to crimes, establishes retributive justice. Moving from Kant and Hegel to 
contemporary theorists, Ernest Van Den Haag asserts that while the execution of the innocent is 
unjust, it is necessary in order to deter future criminal acts.2 In response to Van Den Haag, 
Jeffrey H. Reiman argues that while the death penalty establishes retributive justice, it should be 
abolished in order to ensure the civilization and maturation of modern states.3 In the second 
chapter, I will discuss theories based on deterrence. Ernest Van Den Haag maintains that even 
though the death penalty does not deter potential criminals, it should still be applied because it 
may possibly save the lives of murder victims.4 Responding to Van Den Haag, John P. Conrad 
asserts that the threat of execution can only deter individuals who rationally consider whether to 
commit crimes, and because most crimes are based upon impulse and passion, the death penalty 
is not an effective deterrent.5 The theories discussed in these two chapters rely upon 
philosophical arguments rather than examining the practice of capital punishment in context.  
In the third chapter, I will evaluate theories which analyze punishment based upon 
context. Friedrich Nietzsche purports that punishment functions as a tool of society’s revenge, 
and that society gains pleasure in witnessing others be punished. Further, Nietzsche states that 
punishment has not served one consistent purpose over time, but rather has evolved to further a 
variety of goals.6 Michel Foucault evaluates punishment in terms of its practice in context, 
employing historical analysis in order to critique norms of punishment. In terms of capital 
                                                
2 Ernest Van Den Haag, “On Deterrence and the Death Penalty,” Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 60.2 (1969). 
3 Jeffrey H. Reiman, “Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty: Answering van den Haag,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 14.2 (1985).  
4 Van Den Haag, “On Deterrence and the Death Penalty.” 
5 Ernest Van Den Haag and John Phillips Conrad, The Death Penalty: A Debate (New York: Plenum Press, 1983. 
6 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, trans. Carol Diethe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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punishment, Foucault argues against not only the death penalty, but all definitive sentences.7 
William E. Connolly draws from both Nietzsche and Foucault, arguing that American 
punishment provides a legal avenue for society to seek revenge upon outsiders, particularly poor 
and African-American individuals.8 In the fourth chapter, I will discuss five influential Supreme 
Court cases, and determine which theories they accept or reject. In Furman v. Georgia (1972), 
the Court ruled that applying the death penalty in a capricious manner constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment, while in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the Court determined that the imposition 
of the death penalty does not violate the Eighth Amendment.9 In McCleskey v. Kemp (1987), the 
Court ruled that the imposition of the death penalty under Georgia legislation is constitutional 
despite evidence of racial discrimination in its application.10 Finally, the Court narrowed the 
application of the death penalty in Ford v. Wainwright (1986) and Atkins v. Virginia (2002), 
holding that the death penalty cannot be applied to the insane or to the intellectually disabled, 
respectively.11 By discussing the intersections between these cases and the major theories 
underpinning the American death penalty, I will be able to determine the Supreme Court’s 
theoretical view of capital punishment and discuss its implications for abolishing the American 
death penalty.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
7 Michel Foucault, “Questions of Method,” in Power, ed. James D. Fabion (New York: The New Press, 2000). 
8 William Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).  
9 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
10 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
11 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
Sullivan 4 
Chapter I: Theories of Justice 
Many theorists base their support of or opposition to the death penalty upon their own 
conceptions of justice. Before discussing modern theorists’ writings on whether capital 
punishment is just, it is necessary to examine Immanuel Kant’s and G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophy 
on justice and punishment. As Alan Brudner, Ernest Van Den Haag, and John P. Conrad 
interpret their writings, both Kant and Hegel establish a concept of retributive punishment based 
upon the lex talionis, asserting that criminals should be subjected to punishment in proportion to 
their crimes. Brudner also examines Kant’s and Hegel’s contrasting views on pardoning 
criminals, which he believes are based upon the philosophers’ conceptions of human dignity. 
Steven S. Schwarzschild’s argument that Kant’s basic philosophy is at odds with his acceptance 
of capital punishment is ultimately invalid, but distinguishes the correct understanding of Kant’s 
views on punishment while identifying some of his basic philosophical beliefs. Turning to 
modern theorists, Van Den Haag states that while executing innocent people is unjust, it is 
necessary in order to ensure that potential victims’ lives are saved through deterrence. Both 
Conrad and Jeffrey H. Reiman write in response to Van Den Haag; while Conrad states that the 
death penalty is unjust in itself, Reiman argues that the death penalty accomplishes retributive 
justice, but should be abolished to further society. Ultimately, none of these theorists consider 
the potential revenge and racism that may drive societies that accept the death penalty. I believe 
that these theories, which will be explored in the third chapter of this thesis, are crucial to 
understanding American society’s continual imposition of the death penalty.  
Modern theorists’ perceptions of justice and capital punishment are shaped by the 
Enlightenment philosophy of both Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel. Writing in his essay 
“Retributivism and the Death Penalty,” Alan Brudner defines Kant and Hegel as retributivists, as 
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do both Ernest Van Den Haag and John P. Conrad in The Death Penalty: A Debate. According to 
Brudner, the retributive theory emerged in opposition to the utilitarian conception of punishment, 
in which “the criminal is sacrificed, or used as a means, to the welfare of the majority,” and the 
state imposes punishment upon an individual in order to warn society against wrongdoing.12 As 
its principal aim is deterrence, the utilitarian theory may therefore justify punishment of the 
innocent and preventative punishment.1314 In contrast, retributivists such as Kant and Hegel view 
punishment as a moral good which is intended to “annul wrong and thereby vindicate right” 
rather than deter, protect, or reform.15 In opposition to the utilitarian concept of inflicting 
punishment as a means to an end, Kant and Hegel believed that the principal aim of punishment 
should be justice.16 According to Conrad, Kant’s retributive concept of justice is based on the lex 
talionis, which dictates that criminals should be punished with the same actions they inflicted 
upon their victims.17  
Brudner, Conrad, and Van Den Haag assert that the Kantian and Hegelian concept of 
retributive punishment accomplishes justice by reaffirming both the immorality of crime and the 
human dignity of the criminal. Although punishment cannot undo the criminal’s actions, Brudner 
states that Hegel believed that punishment “annuls wrong by demonstrating the non-being of the 
criminal principle.”18 This criminal principle is an individual’s claim to arbitrary and unlimited 
freedom, and crime upsets society’s moral order by alleging that this principle is valid.19 By 
                                                
12 Alan Brudner, “Retributivism and the Death Penalty,” The University of Toronto Law Journal 
30.4 (1980): 341.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Van Den Haag’s theories of justice and deterrence both seem to be based upon the utilitarian conception of 
punishment. 
15 Brudner, “Retributivism and the Death Penalty,” 341.  
16 Ernest Van Den Haag and John Phillips Conrad, The Death Penalty: A Debate (New York: Plenum Press, 1983), 
79. 
17 Ibid, 22.  
18 Brudner, “Retributivism and the Death Penalty,” 346.  
19 Ibid.  
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punishing the criminal, the state asserts that the criminal principle is invalid, “‘negating’ the 
criminal’s ‘negation of the law.’”2021  
In addition to affirming the immorality of criminal acts, retributive punishment also 
preserves the human dignity of the criminal. In Van Den Haag’s view, Kant and Hegel believed 
that the criminal has both the moral duty and the right to submit to punishment. It is only through 
this punishment that the criminal’s human dignity is repaired.22 Kant believed that capital 
punishment must be imposed upon murderers, as to refrain from executing a murderer would 
“deny him his human dignity as a rational and responsible person.”23 Brudner also interprets 
retributive punishment in this way, saying that because the criminal violates his own rights as 
well as those of others by “asserting a right to unlimited freedom,” his own rational will and 
dignity are restored through punishment.24 
Kant and Hegel’s retributive theories of punishment imply that only the responsible, 
rational offender should be subjected to punishment for his crimes. Brudner states that 
“retributivism accounts for the connection between punishment and desert.”25 Thus, punishment 
will not be inflicted upon the innocent, nor will it be imposed upon those who have no awareness 
or conception of the immorality of their crime. Conrad maintains that the right of the criminal to 
be punished does not extend to children or to the insane, but rather is reserved for the rational 
                                                
20 Alan Brudner, “Retributivism and the Death Penalty,” The University of Toronto Law Journal 
30.4 (1980): 346. 
21 Ernest Van Den Haag and John Phillips Conrad, The Death Penalty: A Debate (New York: Plenum Press, 1983), 
41. 
22 Ibid, 276. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Brudner, “Retributivism and the Death Penalty,” 347. 
25 Ibid. 
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individual who is capable of choice.26 In Brudner’s view, retributive punishment is only imposed 
upon those with the mens rea, or criminal intent, to commit injustice.27 
 The retributive theory of punishment espoused by Kant and Hegel asserts that murderers 
must be executed in order to accomplish justice, but does not advocate for exact adherence to the 
lex talionis principle. Brudner states that the retributive theory necessarily indicates capital 
punishment for first-degree murder in order to confirm the lex talionis.28 According to Brudner, 
Hegel maintained that the criminal must be punished “in accordance with the principle laid down 
by his deed” in order to respect his human self-determination.29 Further, Conrad quotes Kant, 
who held that murderers must be executed, writing, “there is no equality between the crime and 
the retribution unless the criminal is judicially condemned and put to death.”30 Therefore, the 
retributive theory of punishment implies that the criminal who takes another individual’s life 
must be put to death himself.  
However, both Brudner and Conrad conclude that Kant and Hegel did not support 
enforcing the lex talionis to the degree of subjecting criminals to exact reciprocal punishments, 
such as raping rapists or torturing torturers.31 In fact, Hegel rejected strict adherence to the lex 
talionis, saying “in crime, as that which is characterized at bottom by the infinite aspect of the 
deed, the purely external, specific character vanishes.”32 In other words, Kant and Hegel believed 
that retributive punishment is determined by the moral significance of the crime rather than the 
                                                
26 Ernest Van Den Haag and John Phillips Conrad, The Death Penalty: A Debate (New York: Plenum Press, 1983), 
40. 
27 Alan Brudner, “Retributivism and the Death Penalty,” The University of Toronto Law Journal 
30.4 (1980): 347. 
28 Ibid, 350.  
29 Ibid, 348. 
30 Van Den Haag and Conrad, The Death Penalty: A Debate, 22.  
31 Ibid, 38. 
32 Brudner, “Retributivism and the Death Penalty,” 350.  
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qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the crime itself.33 The criminal’s right must be 
infringed in “equal weight” to the rights he infringed when committing his crime, meaning that 
the most severe penalties are reserved for the worst crimes.34 
 In his interpretation of Kant and Hegel’s retributive conceptions of justice and capital 
punishment, Brudner analyzes both philosophers’ perspective on the sovereign’s right to punish 
criminals. Brudner quotes Kant in The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, in which the 
philosopher wrote that the sovereign “can make use of the right to pardon only in connection 
with crimes committed against himself.” Kant stated that for the sovereign to pardon a criminal 
who had injured another citizen would “constitute the greatest injustice toward his subjects.”35 
Therefore, Kant believed that the right to pardon can only be justly exercised in cases of treason; 
otherwise, punishment must be imposed in order to preserve justice.36 Hegel also believed that 
the right to pardon is the sole power of the sovereign, but asserted that it could be justly 
exercised for any crime without annulling the law. Brudner quotes Hegel, who stated that to 
pardon is to “actualize Spirit’s power of making undone what has been done and wiping out a 
crime by forgiving and forgetting it.”37 
 Brudner argues that Kant and Hegel differ in their opinions on the justice of pardoning 
criminals due to their contrasting conceptions of human dignity. For Kant, the individual’s 
dignity derives from his connection with the rest of the human species. His individual will is 
constantly in conflict with this shared human dignity, and he must strive to stifle this self-
interested aspect of his personality. Therefore, in Kant’s view, pardoning a criminal would 
                                                
33Alan Brudner, “Retributivism and the Death Penalty,” The University of Toronto Law Journal 
30.4 (1980): 350. 
34 Ibid, 351. 
35 Ibid, 352. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
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“leave standing the claim of selfishness to validity and thus... leave justice unsatisfied.”38 In 
contrast, Hegel believed that dignity derives from a divine, transcendent “Spirit” to whom the 
human individual is subordinate. This “Spirit” allows itself to be negated when the individual 
commits a crime, only to demonstrate its sovereignty through punishment when the individual’s 
self-interested will is denied.39 In Brudner’s interpretation of Hegel, pardoning criminals rather 
than punishing them establishes the sovereignty of the “Spirit” even more clearly. Mercy can 
accomplish justice by negating the individual’s selfishness, “robbing evil of its power of being 
and so accomplishing man’s dignity beyond threat of subversion.”40 
 Steven S. Schwarzschild details his conception of Kantian capital punishment in his essay 
“Kantianism on the Death Penalty (and Related Social Problems).” Schwarzschild contrasts six 
of Kant’s general philosophical principles with the philosopher’s theory on the death penalty and 
concludes that Kant’s ethical principles “should have made him a radical opponent of capital 
punishment.”41 First, Schwarzschild contends that Kant’s belief that an individual should never 
be used as a means to an end is at odds with his support of the death penalty. In Schwarzschild’s 
view, imposing capital punishment necessarily implies using a human life as a tool to deter 
future crime.42 Second, Schwarzschild argues that Kant’s belief that persons are “holy” and 
should be treated with dignity and respect rather than as objects should have led him to oppose 
the death penalty. Schwarzschild cites Beccaria, who maintained that executing an individual 
denies his humanity.43 Third, Schwarzschild examines Kant’s belief that we should judge 
                                                
38Alan Brudner, “Retributivism and the Death Penalty,” The University of Toronto Law Journal 
30.4 (1980): 353. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Steven S. Schwarzschild, “Kantianism on the Death Penalty (and Related Social Problems),” Archives for 
Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 71.3 (1985): 347.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid, 348.  
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ourselves harshly while judging others leniently, “for what the ethical and theoretical principles 
were that underlay the actions of others we have no access to; we can judge only their observable 
actions.”44 In Schwarzschild’s view, this principle is divergent with support of capital 
punishment, as it implies that the state should not execute criminals due to its inability to 
perceive their motives.  
 Schwarzschild also argues that Kant’s belief in the “impenetrable privacy of personal 
morality” also indicates that he should have opposed the death penalty. Kant asserted that while 
the law can determine people’s actions, whether they act “according to the law,” it has no 
awareness of their beliefs and motives, whether they act “because of the law.”45 In 
Schwarzschild’s view, this belief directly conflicts with Kant’s assertion that the murderer 
should be punished “proportionate to [his] inward evil,” because the state is unaware of the 
criminal’s inner self and is therefore unable to exact punishment.46 Fifth, Schwarzschild states 
that Kant’s belief that the positive law is only an “approximation” of rational morality should 
make him an opponent of the death penalty, as he cannot advocate for executing individuals on 
mere approximations.47 Lastly, Schwarzschild argues that Kant’s belief that an individual cannot 
“bind himself by contract to the kind of dependency through which he ceases to be a person” 
should have led the philosopher to oppose the death penalty. In Schwarzschild’s view, Kant’s 
concept of retributive justice contradicts his belief that individuals cannot consent to the loss of 
their own humanity.48 
                                                
44 Steven S. Schwarzschild, “Kantianism on the Death Penalty (and Related Social Problems),” Archives for 
Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 71.3 (1985): 348. 
45 Ibid, 349. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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 After examining what he views as the logical inconsistencies within Kant’s theory of 
capital punishment, Schwarzschild argues that these apparent inconsistencies can be explained 
by Kant’s concept of transcendentalism. Schwarzschild states that when approaching a certain 
science or law, Kant first observed that the law existed, then examined the rational, logical 
implications that produced the law.49 As all states imposed capital punishment during Kant’s 
time, Schwarzschild argues that its universal existence gave the punishment a priori validity. 
Therefore, Kant did not question the morality of the death penalty, but instead examined “its 
rational presuppositions.”50 
 In my view, Brudner, Van Den Haag, and Conrad all interpret Kant’s and Hegel’s 
conceptions of retributive punishment clearly and accurately. It is essential to understand the 
basic concept of retributive punishment before examining modern theorists’ perspectives of 
justice and capital punishment. Indeed, both Conrad and Jeffrey H. Reiman use Kantian and 
Hegelian philosophy to elucidate their own theories of the death penalty and justice. Further, I 
believe that Van Den Haag draws his theories of justice and retribution from the utilitarian 
conception of punishment, though he does not mention this in his writing. Brudner’s analysis of 
Kant’s and Hegel’s contrasting theories on the justice of pardoning criminals is also an important 
distinction which clarifies other theorists’ usage of their philosophy. Schwarzschild’s argument 
that Kant’s basic philosophical beliefs diverge from his support of the death penalty seems valid 
on its face, but after further examination, it is clear that Schwarzschild fundamentally 
misunderstands Kant’s conception of retributive punishment. Though Kant did assert that an 
individual should not be used as the means to an end, he argued this in opposition to 
unnecessarily harsh utilitarian punishment, which was conceived to accomplish deterrence, while 
                                                
49 Steven S. Schwarzschild, “Kantianism on the Death Penalty (and Related Social Problems),” Archives for 
Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 71.3 (1985): 349. 
50 Ibid, 350. 
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remaining supportive of proportional retributive punishment. Further, Kant’s belief in the dignity 
of persons actually corresponds with his support of retributive punishment, as he maintained that 
punishment restores and honors the dignity of the individual. Schwarzschild seems to have 
examined Kant’s philosophical principles out of their respective contexts.  
 Ernest Van Den Haag was one of the most ardent proponents of the death penalty during 
the late twentieth century. Van Den Haag addresses many critics’ argument that the death 
penalty is an unjust form of punishment in his article “Deterrence and the Death Penalty.” Critics 
claim that the death penalty is an unjust punishment both because it is sometimes imposed upon 
the innocent and because it is disproportionately inflicted upon the guilty poor. However, Van 
Den Haag purports that these arguments prove only that the death penalty is applied unjustly, not 
that the punishment itself is unjust. Further, he maintains that these critics’ arguments are only 
relevant if “doing justice” by punishing only those who are guilty equally is a purpose of 
punishment. However, if one believes that this concept of “doing justice” is a purpose of 
punishment, one can defend any punishment, even capital punishment, if it effectively 
accomplishes this justice.51  
Critics of the death penalty therefore make a fundamentally flawed argument when 
labelling the death penalty as unjust and simultaneously rejecting not only “the merits… of 
specific arguments based on justice” but also “doing justice” as a purpose of punishment.52 Van 
Den Haag summarizes his argument, saying, “If justice is not a purpose of penalties, injustice 
cannot be an objection to the death penalty, or to any other; if it is, justice cannot be ruled out as 
an argument for any penalty.”53 In his view, one cannot claim that the death penalty is unjust 
                                                
51 Ernest Van Den Haag, “On Deterrence and the Death Penalty,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 60.2 
(1969): 141. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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because it is sometimes imposed upon the innocent and applied unequally while simultaneously 
arguing that punishing the guilty equally is not a valid purpose of punishment.  
Van Den Haag also argues that while the death penalty may be applied unjustly, it is its 
distribution that is unjust rather than the punishment itself. He states that “It is not the penalty… 
which is unjust when inflicted on the innocent, but its imposition on the innocent.”54 This unjust 
application of capital punishment typically stems from the trial process, where poor defendants 
cannot afford to pay for adequate representation and so are likelier to be sentenced to death. 
However, Van Den Haag maintains that as capital punishment has a permanence that other 
punishments lack, trials that end with a death sentence are more likely to be fair, meaning that 
the death penalty is “probably less often unjustly inflicted.”55 When considering imposing the 
death penalty, the difficulty is not that the punishment is more unjust than others, but that “it is 
always irrevocable.” According to Van Den Haag, all penalties are irreversible, even prison 
sentences, but the death penalty “is irrevocable as well” due to its permanence.56 Therefore, 
when the death penalty is inflicted upon an innocent victim, an “irrevocable injustice” has been 
committed.57 
However, in Van Den Haag’s view, this injustice is permissible and justifiable. Van Den 
Haag maintains that to do justice, one often must choose the least unjust of two injustices, saying 
“however one defines justice, to support it cannot mean less than to favor the least injustice.”58 
As both “the death of innocents because of judicial error” and “the death of innocents by 
murder” are unjust, one must determine which punishment effectively minimizes this loss of 
                                                
54 Ernest Van Den Haag, “On Deterrence and the Death Penalty,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 60.2 
(1969): 142.  
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
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innocent life by its deterrent effects.59 In his view, as the imposition of capital punishment would 
greatly reduce the number of innocent victims murdered, whereas the imposition of the death 
penalty upon innocents only affects a small percentage of defendants, this loss of innocent life 
can be justified because “fewer are lost than would be lost without it.”60 Van Den Haag then 
states that the death penalty can only be critiqued on grounds of injustice if its deterrence “is 
valued less than the harm it will cause if inflicted upon innocent people.”61 Therefore, to further 
his argument that the death penalty accomplishes justice, Van Den Haag turns to deterrence, as 
critics cannot prove the death penalty to be unjust unless “the added usefulness (deterrence) 
expected from irrevocability is thought less important than the added harm.”62 He must 
demonstrate that the death penalty deters enough crimes to justify the “irrevocable injustice” of 
sentencing innocent people to death. 
I find two major flaws in Van Den Haag’s argument which indicate that he does not 
effectively prove that the death penalty accomplishes justice. First, his assertion that “doing 
justice” is ensuring that only the guilty are punished and that the equally guilty are punished 
equally ignores other conceptions of justice. Justice is an essentially contested concept, meaning 
that different theorists define it in different ways, and Van Den Haag overlooks the possibility 
that critics who believe that capital punishment is unjust may define justice differently. Those 
who oppose the death penalty because it is unjust may view the act of taking a human life as 
unjust on its face, beyond merely condemning its unequal application. Second, Van Den Haag’s 
argument that doing justice necessarily entails “favoring the least injustice” may ensure that less 
                                                
59 Ernest Van Den Haag, “On Deterrence and the Death Penalty,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 60.2 
(1969): 142. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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innocent lives are spared, but still justifies sentencing innocent defendants to death.63 If criminals 
are spared the death penalty and other criminals are thus motivated to commit murder, the fault is 
with these criminals, but if the state imposes the death penalty upon innocent citizens, no matter 
how few, the fault is with the state. Further, Van Den Haag’s assertion that the death penalty 
accomplishes deterrence rests upon tenuous statistics and flawed logic, meaning that imposing 
the death penalty may not actually “favor the least injustice.” 
In “Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty: Answering van den Haag,” Jeffrey H. 
Reiman critiques Van Den Haag’s argument that the death penalty establishes justice and 
therefore should be imposed. Reiman admits that the death penalty is a just punishment for 
murder, but maintains that it should not be implemented because “abolition of the death penalty 
is part of the civilizing mission of modern states.”64 Therefore, Reiman opposes the death penalty 
not because he believes it to be unjust, but because he believes it is immoral. He begins his 
argument by stating that society “does not regard killing per se as wrong:” killing in self-defense 
or in war is morally permissible, and the death of innocents in accidents is tolerated.65 Reiman’s 
argument responds to Van Den Haag’s assumptions that some crimes deserve capital 
punishment, and that at some point, the death penalty should be imposed upon the guilty if 
enough innocent lives are saved. Therefore, his rejection of the death penalty is made while 
accepting these assumptions as true.66 
 In Reiman’s view, the death penalty accomplishes retributive justice. This justice is 
expressed in the principle of lex talionis, and asserts that “the offender should be paid back with 
                                                
63 Ernest Van Den Haag, “On Deterrence and the Death Penalty,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 60.2 
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suffering he deserves because of the evil he has done.”67 This suffering should either be equal to 
the crime committed, or should be proportional, imposing society’s harshest punishments for the 
most egregious crimes.68 As retribution is perceived as a base desire to exact revenge, one must 
prove that the punishment serves a purpose beyond the gratification of the victim in order to 
show that lex talionis is just. To do so, Reiman constructs his “retributivist principle” using the 
“Hegelian” and “Kantian” approaches, which indicates the reason behind the suffering imposed 
upon criminals.69 
 Reiman’s “Hegelian” approach rests upon “a common moral inspiration: the equality of 
persons.”70 People in society are “equally sovereign individuals,” and the offender upsets the 
equality of persons by asserting an illegitimate sovereignty over his victim by committing a 
crime.71 To restore the equality of persons and assert his own sovereignty, the victim may justly 
impose punishment upon the offender, “[rectifying] the indignity he has suffered by restoring 
[the offender] to equality.”72 Even if the victim refuses to exact punishment and instead chooses 
to forgive the offender, the equality of persons is still restored because it is the victim’s right to 
punish or not punish the offender.73  
Reiman’s “Kantian” approach rests upon the rational nature of individuals. When a 
rational individual commits a crime, he implicitly consents to being punished in the same manner 
as his crime because he accepts responsibility for his own actions.74 This conception of lex 
talionis authorizes victims to exact punishment upon their offenders, but does not compel them 
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to, as such a duty would imply retributivism against positive and neutral acts as well as negative 
ones.75 Reiman states that his “Hegelian” and “Kantian” approaches together create his 
“retributivist principle:” the conclusion that “an offender deserves and his victim has the right to 
impose suffering on the offender equal to that which he imposed on the victim.”76 Because the 
equality and rationality of persons implies moral desert, the death penalty is just according to lex 
talionis.  
After arguing that the lex talionis is just, Reiman turns to the question of whether 
retributive justice should be exercised. Exact adherence to the principle would “allow criminals, 
even the most barbaric of them, to dictate our punishing behavior” by imposing equal 
punishment upon rapists and torturers, something society deems immoral. Reiman asserts that lex 
talionis can be followed and justice accomplished in these situations by refusing to exact an 
equal punishment while choosing to impose a slightly less severe penalty.77 Therefore, a range of 
just punishments exists. The upper limit of this spectrum is “the point after which more 
punishment is unjust to the offender,” and the lower limit is “the point after which less 
punishment is unjust to the victim.”78 By exacting “the closest morally acceptable approximation 
to the lex talionis” in situations in which retribution is immoral, both the equality of persons and 
the rationality of individuals is affirmed and retributive justice may still be accomplished.79 
These alternative punishments must not trivialize the severity of the original crime; Reiman 
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asserts that a sentence of life in prison without parole is a just alternative to the death penalty, as 
those given this sentence are traditionally regarded as “civilly dead.”80 
Therefore, to prove that the death penalty should not be applied even though it 
accomplishes retributive justice, Reiman must argue that it is immoral and should be replaced by 
a less severe but still just punishment. In order to make this argument, Reiman compares the 
societal effects of imposing the death penalty on offenders with those of imposing torture, a 
punishment which society views as inexcusable even when justly deserved.81 Torture and other 
punishments have been deemed immoral due to the progress of civilization and a subsequent 
increase in empathy with others.82 Reiman points to Nietzsche’s observation that “pain did not 
hurt as much as it does today.” From Nietzsche’s statement, Reiman draws the conclusion that 
refusing to inflict overtly painful punishments “both signals the level of our civilization and, by 
our example, continues the work of civilizing.”83 Reiman’s theory that the growth of civilization 
causes a reduction in painful punishments builds upon Emile Durkheim’s “Two Laws of Penal 
Evolution.”84 Durkheim’s laws collectively claim that reducing painful punishment correlates 
with movements both towards more advanced society and less absolutist government.85 
 Reiman then argues that abolishing painful punishments, specifically the death penalty, 
serves the advancement and growth of civilization. Reducing painful punishment when it is 
justly deserved is not an injustice, as “refraining to do what is just is not doing what is unjust.”86 
Therefore, as long as reducing such punishment does not mean that “our lives are thereby made 
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more dangerous,” doing so is permissible and even necessary to advance civilization.87 Reiman 
accepts the argument that the death penalty should be applied if it accomplishes deterrence, but 
he argues that it does not. Having maintained that refraining from using torture as a punishment 
furthers civilization, Reiman indicates the similarities between torture and capital punishment to 
prove that this punishment should also be abolished. Execution, like torture, inflicts “intense 
psychological pain” on the offender. This pain is exacerbated by the fact that a death by 
execution is inflicted by other humans and is foreseen by its victim.88 Further, as both execution 
and torture involve “totally subjugating a person to the power of others,” Reiman claims that 
inflicting such punishments implicates the immorality of the society that imposes them.89 As 
refraining from torturing offenders advances civilization, and because torture and execution 
share significant similarities, abolishing the death penalty is therefore “part of the civilizing 
mission of modern states.”90 
I find Reiman’s argument that the death penalty accomplishes retributive justice but 
should not be imposed because it is immoral and does not further civilization to be very 
convincing. As Reiman defines justice as the lex talionis, it is clear that imposing the death 
penalty furthers this retributive justice. Further, Reiman’s comparisons of the death penalty and 
torture are effective in demonstrating that both punishments are antithetical to the civilization of 
states. However, defining justice in a different manner would effectively challenge Reiman’s 
argument. If justice is defined to also consider social, economic, and racial barriers, one could 
argue that the death penalty is neither moral nor just. Arguments that consider these barriers and 
inequalities within society will be considered in the third chapter of this thesis.  
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In The Death Penalty: A Debate, John P. Conrad briefly describes his conception of 
justice as it relates to capital punishment while responding to Van Den Haag’s arguments in 
support of the death penalty. Essentially, Conrad believes that needlessly taking the life of 
another individual is morally wrong. Conrad bases his theory of justice upon his interpretation of 
a Kantian theory, namely, “the position that human beings must never be treated as means to 
someone else’s end.”91 He admits that Kant did not articulate this theory to criticize capital 
punishment, but uses this principle to guide his own argument. Conrad states that he does not 
question “the right of a person to kill in self-defense” or “the duty of the soldier to fight and kill 
in defense of his country or in a just war.”92 Killing in self-defense is necessary in order to 
protect oneself and one’s property, and soldiers may justifiably kill in battle in order to protect 
their country or defend its values.  
However, Conrad believes that killing “even the odious criminals… in cold blood” is 
morally wrong.93 He views both murders committed by criminals and executions imposed by the 
state as unjust because both are unnecessary and indicative of a lack of human sympathy. 
Therefore, the state cannot teach its citizens that murder is immoral while simultaneously 
“killing [criminals] in cold blood.”94 Conrad maintains that he would support sentencing 
convicted murderers to life imprisonment, but would never endorse executing them even if it 
meant saving future victims of murder, saying “killing people is wrong, and the state may not 
engage in wrongful acts.”95 
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 Conrad also views the potential execution of the wrongly convicted as unjust. Though 
Van Den Haag is willing to accept the execution of these innocent individuals in order to further 
“the killing of authentic murderers,” Conrad views these executions in particular as “injustices of 
the worst kind.”96 Refusing to impose the death penalty and instead sentencing those convicted 
of murder to life imprisonment would avoid this injustice, as life sentences “can be corrected 
with a pardon” if the court later finds the imprisoned to be innocent.97 Conversely, when the 
death penalty is imposed upon an innocent individual, a posthumous pardon is meaningless and 
“the ultimate injustice” has been committed.98 Therefore, Conrad states that the most compelling 
reason why the death penalty should be abolished is to avoid executing innocent individuals, 
saying that because “the prevention of injustice is the business of every good citizen,” abolishing 
capital punishment will assuredly mean the prevention of the greatest injustice.99 
 Unlike Van Den Haag, Reiman, and interpretations of Kantian and Hegelian theory, 
Conrad views unnecessary killing as unjust in and of itself. This is a simplistic argument, but one 
which I believe is more convincing than Van Den Haag’s assertion that imposing the death 
penalty is just even when it executes innocent individuals. By teaching its citizens that needless 
killing is unjust while at the same time executing those convicted of murder, including those who 
may actually be innocent, the state seems hypocritical. However, while Conrad’s basic theory 
that the needless killing of another individual is unjust appeals to my own morals and conception 
of justice, it is not easily accessible to many, particularly those driven by bias and revenge. 
Reiman’s acknowledgement that the death penalty establishes retributive justice, but should be 
abolished in order to further a civilized society may be more convincing, while theoretical 
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critiques of the death penalty based upon race and class discrimination address important 
concrete considerations.  
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Chapter II: Theories of Deterrence 
 In addition to defending or critiquing the death penalty based upon their personal 
conceptions of justice, most modern theorists also evaluate whether the death penalty 
accomplishes deterrence. Deterrence is the use of punishment as a threat to those considering 
criminal acts, and is the main focus of the utilitarian conception of punishment opposed by Kant 
and Hegel. Statistics demonstrate that the American death penalty does not establish deterrence, 
a fact which is acknowledged by Ernest Van Den Haag, Jeffrey H. Reiman, and John P. Conrad. 
Van Den Haag’s theory of deterrence is based upon the principle that the more an individual 
fears a punishment, the likelier he is to obey the law and refrain from criminal acts. Though Van 
Den Haag briefly admits that the death penalty has never been statistically proven to deter 
potential murderers, he asserts that the state should continue to impose capital punishment in 
order to save as many murder potential victims as possible. Both Reiman and Conrad adamantly 
oppose the death penalty, and critique Van Den Haag’s theory of deterrence in their writings, 
similarly concluding that the death penalty should be abolished because it does not accomplish 
deterrence. This theoretical discussion seems somewhat unnecessary due to the statistics that 
inconvertibly demonstrate that the death penalty does not accomplish deterrence, but it is 
important to examine as many theorists base their writings upon it. Both the theories of justice 
discussed in the previous chapter and the theories of deterrence discussed here are, in my view, 
secondary to the factors of revenge and racism which will be discussed in the third chapter of 
this thesis.  
As well as arguing that the death penalty is a just form of punishment, Van Den Haag 
also asserts that the death penalty accomplishes deterrence. In the article “On Deterrence and the 
Death Penalty,” Van Den Haag argues that capital punishment effectively deters criminal acts. 
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He makes a nearly identical argument for deterrence in The Death Penalty: A Debate. He begins 
his argument by stating that the death penalty can accomplish neither rehabilitation nor 
protection. Sentencing criminals to death has no rehabilitative effect on them, and a sentence of 
life in prison would protect society as effectively as imposing the death penalty. Instead, Van 
Den Haag believes that the death penalty cannot be justified “unless “doing justice” or “deterring 
others” are among our penal aims.”100 Supporters of the death penalty must only prove that one 
of these purposes is validly accomplished, but critics must disprove both in order to persuasively 
argue against the death penalty. After addressing the death penalty’s ability to perform justice, 
Van Den Haag turns to the issue of deterrence.  
Van Den Haag maintains that deterrence does not depend on some theoretical concept of 
rationality, but on “the likelihood and on the regularity… of human responses to danger; and 
further on the possibility of reinforcing internal controls by vicarious external experiences.”101 
He delineates his theory of human responsiveness to danger, saying that humans will refrain 
from certain dangerous activities due to fear and the risk of injury even if they have “no direct 
experience” with those particular injuries or feared situations.102 Humans do not “consciously 
weigh… expected pleasure or possible pain” when refraining from dangerous activities, but 
instead abstain from these behaviors “because one literally does not conceive of the action one 
refrains from.”103 Van Den Haag then extends this theory of human responsiveness to danger to 
man-made punishments inflicted by governments, arguing that these punishments “deter those 
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who have not violated the law for the same reasons… as do natural dangers.”104 The punishments 
imposed by governments provide an additional restraint to engaging in dangerous activities; 
because these punishments are man-made, citizens tend to assign an internal morality to actions 
the government prohibits. Thus, governments motivate citizens to behave lawfully by threatening 
and inflicting punishment, “constantly reinforcing… conscience” by imposing “external 
authority on recalcitrants.”105 
However, only certain individuals are deterred by the threat of the death penalty. Van 
Den Haag asserts that some individuals do not respond appropriately to the external threat of 
government punishment. Those who are self-destructive and those who are “incapable of 
responding to threats, or even of grasping them” cannot be deterred even if government 
punishments are made more severe or more widely applied.106 A third group of individuals 
“might respond to more certain or more severe penalties” such as the death penalty.107 While the 
threat of punishment “[is] not likely to deter habitual offenders… [or those] intoxicated by their 
own passions,” it will “help deter people from becoming habitual offenders.”108 Therefore, the 
threat of the death penalty will effectively deter rational individuals who have not yet committed 
murder.109 Van Den Haag argues that deciding whether to increase punishment depends upon 
three different factors. These factors are first, the societal importance of the law prohibiting the 
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crime, second, the size and likely reaction of the group the punishment will apply to, and third, 
the reaction to and ease of enforcing the harsher penalty.110 
Van Den Haag turns then to the arguments of Lester Pearson, the former Prime Minister 
of Canada and an ardent critic of the death penalty. Pearson contended that the death penalty 
fails to have a deterrent effect in cases of “slums, ghettos, and personality disorders,” an 
argument which Van Den Haag then rebuts by explaining that none of these three conditions is 
causally linked to crime.111 In regards to slums, Van Den Haag admits that the disadvantages of 
poverty “may lead to ambition, frustration, resentment, and, if insufficiently restrained, to 
crime,” but argues that crime is not actually caused by this poverty, as most impoverished people 
are not criminals, and crimes are also committed by the rich.112 Thus, the elimination of poverty 
will not lead to the end of crime as, in the words of Aristotle, “the greatest crimes are committed 
not for the sake of basic necessities but for superfluities.”113 Turning to ghettos, Van Den Haag 
maintains that there is no link between ethnic separation and crime, noting that crime is high in 
some ghettos and low in others. Lastly, Van Den Haag states that personality disorders and 
mental illnesses are not necessary or sufficient conditions for committing crimes, except in cases 
a clinical diagnosis proves otherwise. Further, the likelihood of occurrence of mental illnesses in 
prisons does not exceed the likelihood of occurrence in wider society.114 
Arguments like Pearson’s, Van Den Haag states, are are attempts to eliminate the causes 
of crime and, in doing so, eliminate the effects, rather than mitigating the effects of crime by 
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punishing criminals.115 In Van Den Haag’s view, instituting certain punishments for crimes will 
reliably reduce the crime rate, as whether an individual chooses to commit a crime depends on 
“whether the desire for it, or for whatever is to be secured by it, is stronger than the desire to 
avoid the costs involved.”116 When considering both desire and cost, “neither is intrinsically 
more causal than the other.”117 If one has the desire to commit a crime, the cost will determine 
their action, and if one recognizes the cost of a certain crime, their desire to commit it will shift 
accordingly. Therefore, the crime rate can be manipulated by the government decreasing or 
increasing either the desire or the cost. As the government cannot easily change individuals’ 
desire to commit crimes, crime is more effectively reduced by increasing costs, by instituting 
harsher punishments such as the death penalty. Van Den Haag notes that the United States 
government’s policy on crime has been skewed towards affecting “the conditions producing the 
inclination to” committing crimes; this ineffective attention to desires while ignoring costs may 
have led to a high crime rate.118 
Having established that state-imposed costs such as the death penalty have a deterrent 
effect on crime, Van Den Haag turns to the question of whether the death penalty deters more 
than alternative punishments, “such as life imprisonment or any lengthy term of imprisonment.119 
He references a study which showed that the homicide rate in similar areas with and without the 
death penalty does not vary, and that the homicide rate in a single area does not vary 
significantly before and after the death penalty is abolished. This study indicates a lack of 
evidence for deterrence, meaning “that deterrence has not demonstrated statistically -- not that 
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non-deterrence has been.”120 Van Den Haag then outlined several reasons why the study had 
failed to show deterrence, concluding “not to demonstrate presence of the effect is not the same 
as to demonstrate its absence.”121 
Therefore, because statistics do not reliably demonstrate whether the death penalty 
establishes deterrence, two possible outcomes exist. First, if the death penalty is imposed but 
achieves no deterrence, “the life of a convicted murderer has been expended in vain,” signifying 
a net loss in lives.122 Second, if the death penalty is imposed and successfully deters homicide, 
both the lives of potential future murderers and those of their victims are saved, indicating a net 
gain in lives. Therefore, imposing the death penalty implies risking something “certain” -- the 
death or life of convicted murders -- to safeguard something “uncertain” -- the death or life of 
future murder victims.123 Van Den Haag maintains that there must be more proof that the death 
penalty establishes deterrence than for the deterring effect of other, less severe punishments, 
largely because of the irrevocability of capital punishment. As it is more crucial to save the lives 
of victims than to save the lives of murderers, critics of the death penalty must prove that the 
irrevocability of capital punishment does not affect deterrence. Supporters of death penalty thus 
have the lesser burden of proving “that there is no more uncertainty about [the death penalty] 
than about greater severity in general.”124 
Van Den Haag concludes his discussion of deterrence by maintaining that proponents of 
the death penalty can easily meet this burden. He contends that the death penalty deters because 
it is more severe than other punishments. Van Den Haag states that while penalties such as life in 
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prison are certainly harsh, they cannot meet the severity of the death penalty, as “the death 
penalty does not just threaten to make life unpleasant -- it threatens to take life altogether.”125 
Reiterating his statistical analysis, he maintains that while studies have found no positive 
deterrence between the death penalty and homicide rates, they also have not found negative 
deterrence.126 He also argues that critics of the death penalty only oppose the penalty because 
“executions are more subjected to social control than murder,” an argument that Van Den Haag 
believes to be flawed because it is true of all punishments and does not provide an adequate 
reason for abolishing capital punishment.127 
However, even if a link between the death penalty and deterrence cannot be conclusively 
proven, Van Den Haag maintains that the death penalty should still be implemented. Uncertainty 
over whether the death penalty establishes deterrence entails choosing between “the certainty of 
the convicted murderer’s death by execution and the likelihood of the survival of future victims 
of other murderers on the one hand, and on the other his certain survival and the likelihood of the 
death of new victims.”128 In Van Den Haag’s mind, it is moral to choose to apply the death 
penalty and refuse to risk the lives of potential murder victims to save those of convicted 
criminals. Van Den Haag never absolutely proves that the death penalty accomplishes 
deterrence, but is content to “risk the possible ineffectiveness of executions” because it will lead 
to a net gain in lives saved.129 
I find Van Den Haag’s argument linking the death penalty to deterrence to be 
inconclusive and flawed for several reasons. First, I disagree with Van Den Haag’s argument that 
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eliminating crime is more easily accomplished by punishing criminals than by mitigating its 
causes. Van Den Haag quotes Aristotle in contending that it is the desire for “superfluities” 
rather than the lack of basic necessities that leads individuals to commit crimes, essentially 
stating that there is no link between poverty and crime. However, the eradication of poverty 
would certainly reduce a great number of crimes committed for the sake of basic necessities, 
while leaving “the greatest crimes” unaffected. 
 Second, the statistics Van Den Haag relies upon to argue that the death penalty 
establishes deterrence actually point to the opposite conclusion. The study he cited found no 
change in the crime rate in similar areas with and without the death penalty, and also found no 
change in the crime rate in one area before and after the death penalty had been abolished.130 The 
unaffected crime rate in both sections of the study proves that, at least for that set of data, the 
death penalty had no deterrent effect upon potential murderers. Therefore, Van Den Haag’s 
argument that the death penalty establishes deterrence rests only upon his own dicta. 
Finally, in stating “I’d rather execute a man convicted of having murdered others than to 
put the lives of innocents at risk,” Van Den Haag completely ignores the possibly that the 
convicted man may be innocent as well. Though he produces a long and complicated argument, 
Van Den Haag ultimately fails to prove deterrence, and resolves this failing by weighing the 
lives of convicted murders and potential murder victims. Keeping in mind the societal bias 
against convicted criminals, which is discussed by William E. Connolly and other theorists, it is 
unsurprising that Van Den Haag chooses to risk their lives.  
 In “Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty: Answering van den Haag,” Jeffrey 
Reiman argues that though the death penalty does accomplish retributive justice, it should not be 
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imposed because it is immoral and because abolishing it advances civilization. However, he 
concedes that if that capital punishment has a greater deterrent effect than life in prison, this 
would indicate that “we had not reached a level of civilization at which we could protect 
ourselves without imposing this horrible fate on murderers.”131 Though the death penalty is 
immoral, it must be imposed if it deters murder in order to protect society. Statistical evidence 
does not indicate that the death penalty deters more than life imprisonment, but Van Den Haag 
argues that the death penalty should still be imposed because “the higher the cost of something, 
the fewer people will choose it,” meaning that at least some potential murderers will be deterred 
by the death penalty.132 Reiman attempts to disprove Van Den Haag’s “common sense” 
argument, contending that the death penalty does not deter potential murderers theoretically as 
well as statistically.  
 Reiman presents four separate arguments to refute Van Den Haag’s claims. First, Reiman 
states that the fact that the death penalty is more feared than life imprisonment does not 
necessarily imply that it has a greater deterrent effect. Though one may fear the death penalty 
more than life in prison, Reiman asserts that there is no action that the death penalty would deter 
than an equal likelihood of life imprisonment would not deter as well.133 In his argument, Van 
Den Haag implicitly assumes that murderers have a greater likelihood of being sentenced to 
death than sentenced to life in prison, but if the likelihood of both punishments is equal, both 
deter equally.134 Second, because about 700 suspected felons are killed by police every year, and 
because the number of privately owned guns in America exceeds the number of American 
households, Reiman argues that “anyone contemplating committing a crime already faces a 
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substantial risk of ending up dead as a result.”135 Therefore, an individual who is not deterred by 
the possibility of being killed while committing murder is unlikely to be further deterred by the 
risk of death after being apprehended and convicted.136 
Third, Reiman argues that refusing to implement the death penalty may actually have a 
deterrent effect. Refusing to impose capital punishment, even when it is justly deserved, “also 
teaches a lesson about the wrongfulness of murder.”137 Reiman states that this theory may 
explain the lack of statistical evidence for the death penalty deterring murderers, without denying 
that that some potential murderers will be deterred by its implementation. He argues that even if 
the death penalty deters some murderers, these numbers will be “balanced out by the weakening 
of the deterrent effect of not executing, such that no net reduction in murders will result.”138 
Reiman also argues that this theory invalidates Van Den Haag’s argument that the death penalty 
should be imposed regardless of its deterrent effects, as it is better to risk the lives of murderers 
than those of innocent potential victims. If refusing to impose capital punishment deters potential 
murderers, then inflicting it also risks innocent lives; therefore, “the only reasonable course of 
action is to refrain from imposing… a horrible fate.”139 Fourth, Reiman attempts to invalidate 
Van Den Haag’s argument that the death penalty deters because it is more feared than life 
imprisonment. Van Den Haag defends this assertion by stating that many on death row attempt to 
commute their sentences to life in prison; Reiman states that this logic implies that individuals 
sentenced to death-by-torture would undoubtedly attempt to commute their sentences to 
execution. Therefore, the logical conclusion of Van Den Haag’s theory is that murders should be 
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sentenced to death-by-torture to maximize deterrence.140 Reiman concludes that because there is 
no conclusive evidence that inflicting the death penalty will protect society, the punishment 
should be abolished in order to advance civilization.  
I find most of Reiman’s theoretical arguments that the death penalty does not deter 
potential murderers unconvincing and flawed. He first asserts that, from a theoretical standpoint, 
potential criminals are equally deterred by an equal likelihood of either being sentenced to death 
or to life in prison. Both punishments essentially deprive individuals of their existence as 
autonomous human beings; because of this crucial similarity, I believe that this particular 
argument has merit. However, Reiman’s theory that potential murderers already risk death due to 
the number of privately owned guns in America presupposes that these criminals carefully weigh 
this possibility before committing crimes. His argument that abolishing the death penalty may 
actually accomplish deterrence also presumes that potential murderers rely on moral 
considerations. Lastly, Reiman’s assertion that Van Den Haag’s theories necessitate 
implementing death-by-torture to deter additional crimes is dubious and illogical. Indeed, 
Reiman’s and other theorists’ arguments concerning deterrence seem wholly unnecessary, as 
statistics demonstrate that there is no clear link between imposing capital punishment and crime 
rates. Reiman also ignores the possibility that perhaps the death penalty does not deter potential 
murderers due to the immense societal pressures placed upon those in a certain race or class. 
This theory will be explored in the third chapter of this thesis.  
John Conrad also critiques Van Den Haag’s common sense theory of deterrence in The 
Death Penalty: A Debate, making arguments similar to Reiman’s. Conrad states that he agrees 
with Van Den Haag on three points. First, “the incapacitation of murderers will not reduce the 
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murder rate;” instead, the death penalty must deter future offenders to accomplish this 
goal.141Second, there is no empirical proof that the death penalty deters potential murderers, and 
third, the death penalty is a unique punishment because of its severity and finality, as it can only 
be imposed once.142 Conrad then presents three responses to Van Den Haag’s assertion that the 
death penalty accomplishes deterrence because, according to common sense, “if the 
consequences of our actions are particularly unpleasant, we will be moved to refrain from 
engaging in them.”143 First, Conrad argues that “common sense is the wisdom of the common 
man” rather than the criminal, who is driven instead by impulses, passions, and frustrations.144 
The potential murderer does not rationally consider the risks and consequences of his actions, 
and is therefore undeterred by the threat of capital punishment.145 Conrad asserts that the 
“rational criminal man” Van Den Haag describes “seldom commits murder” if he exists at all. 
Further, if this rational criminal does commit murder, he will do so in a way that is “impossible 
for the police to detect.”146 
Second, the fact that many individuals sentenced to death often attempt to commute their 
sentences to life imprisonment does not imply that execution deters more effectively than life 
imprisonment. In Conrad’s view, when an individual is considering committing murder, he does 
not refrain from this act based upon whether he is likelier to be sentenced to life imprisonment or 
to death. Instead, potential murderers “will prefer not to be suspected, not to be arrested, not to 
be tried, and not to be sentenced to anything.”147 Further, those on death row, “no matter how 
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irrational they may be” will attempt to slightly improve their circumstances by commuting their 
sentences to life imprisonment.148 This does not imply that the death penalty deters potential 
murderers, but only that those already sentenced to death fear capital punishment more than life 
imprisonment.  
Third, in the same manner as Reiman, Conrad asserts that when Van Den Haag’s 
common sense argument is taken to its logical conclusion, it implies torture to accomplish 
further deterrence. He states that if one accepts Van Den Haag’s argument that killing a murderer 
can be justified “if we can suppose that 500 innocent victims may thus be spared,” then torturing 
this murderer is also justified “to accomplish the same end.”149 Conrad then articulates several 
“absurd” examples of the acts of torture that might deter more potential murderers than the death 
penalty, wondering if “death on the rack… with a preliminary disembowelment” might save 
twice as many murder victims.150 He states that these ludicrous examples demonstrate the risks 
of using human life as a means to accomplishing the death penalty’s end, deterrence. To 
conclude his critique of Van Den Haag’s theory, Conrad reiterates that capital punishment does 
not achieve deterrence firstly because there is no statistical evidence that capital punishment 
actually deters potential murderers, and secondly because even if it did so, society must 
implement “even more grievous forms of punishment in the interest of public safety.”151 
For the most part, I find Conrad’s arguments in response to Van Den Haag’s theory of 
deterrence convincing. Conrad logically explains that the death penalty does not necessarily 
deter potential murderers because those sentenced to death fear the punishment more than life 
imprisonment. Further, although I do not believe that Van Den Haag would advocate for torture 
                                                
148 Ernest Van Den Haag and John Phillips Conrad, The Death Penalty: A Debate (New York: Plenum Press, 1983), 
73. 
149 Ibid, 74. 
150 Ibid, 74. 
151 Ibid, 75. 
Sullivan 36 
in order to deter an increased number of murders, Conrad is logical in his explanation that if the 
chief aim of punishment is deterrence, then even torture must be implemented to deter as many 
criminals as possible. Though he may exaggerate in stating that the mind of the potential 
murderer is a “dark recess of abnormal psychology” unilluminated by common sense, Conrad 
identifies the flaws in Van Den Haag’s assumption that potential criminals will rationally 
examine the possibility of being sentenced to death when considering committing murder.152 
Conrad’s assertion that potential murderers are instead driven by their passions and frustrations 
is an idea that is espoused and expanded upon by Connolly, Nietzsche, and Foucault in the third 
chapter of this thesis.  
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Chapter III: Reframing Death Penalty Theory 
 Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, and their contemporary counterpart Ernest Van Den Haag 
evaluated the death penalty in terms of retributive justice and deterrence. As discussed in 
Chapters I and II of this thesis, analyses of capital punishment based upon these concepts often 
fail to consider issues of power, revenge, and discrimination. These abstract, philosophical 
arguments do not account for the many inconsistencies within the application of the American 
death penalty, the greatest of which is the fact that it fails to accomplish its purported purposes of 
deterrence and justice. Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, and William Connolly are three 
theorists who reframe the debate on capital punishment in terms of these issues, yielding a more 
nuanced conception both of punishment generally and of the death penalty. These theorists reject 
the concept of autonomous, responsible individuals which Kant and Hegel depend on because 
this assumption ignores context. 
Nietzsche argues that punishment originated as a tool to preserve the conscience, and 
explains that the relationship between a creditor and a debtor created a vengeance-driven 
punishment that today is practiced by governments against unlawful citizens.153 He also argues 
that individuals gain pleasure through punishment, and asserts that punishment has not served 
one consistent purpose throughout history. Foucault does not present a universal theory of 
punishment, but instead explains his method for evaluating punishment and analyzes punishment 
as it is practiced. He argues that punishment is a mechanism of power used to create subjects, 
and that it must be evaluated in terms of its historical context.154 Connolly uses both Nietzsche’s 
and Foucault’s theoretical frameworks to craft his own theory of punishment, namely, that 
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punishment exists as a tool for the privileged to exact revenge upon and discriminate against the 
less powerful.155  
 It is worth noting that both Ernest Van Den Haag and Jeffrey H. Reiman consider the 
Foucauldian question “What is the practice of punishment?” and briefly examine racial 
discrimination and capital punishment. Though Van Den Haag admits that the majority of those 
sentenced to death are poor or black, he denies that this is due to any discrimination in the 
application of capital punishment. He states that “unusual” punishments “may discriminate 
against those to whom [they] are applied in an entirely capricious or in a systematically biased 
manner,” but argues that capital punishment is no longer applied capriciously or discriminatorily 
because of the many opportunities to appeal sentences.156 Further, Van Den Haag alleges that 
any discrimination in the application of the death penalty does not necessitate its abolition, as 
discrimination “is a characteristic not of the penalty but of its distribution to offenders.”157 He 
argues that although the majority of those sentenced to death are poor, and a disproportionate 
number are black, this is because “the poor and black are more tempted to commit crimes, and 
that a greater proportion of them do.”158 By acknowledging that capital punishment is 
disproportionately applied to the poor and black, but accepting this discrimination because their 
status results in their committing more crimes, Van Den Haag demonstrates that he is blind to 
central features of the practice of the death penalty in the United States. 
 When analyzing the lex talionis, Reiman also considers the discrimination he detects in 
the application of capital punishment. As the lex talionis principle states that offenders should be 
subjected to the harms they are responsible for imposing on their victims, Reiman argues that the 
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principle implies that the offender must be fully responsible for his crime, both psychologically 
and socially.159 As some individuals commit crimes as a result of the unjust social circumstances 
they suffer, Reiman argues that those who benefit from these circumstances share responsibility 
for these crimes.160 He states that because impoverishment and other unjust social conditions can 
be remedied, American society “[has] no right to exact the full cost of murders from our 
murderers until we have done everything possible to rectify the conditions that produce their 
crimes.”161 However, Reiman acknowledges that his audience may not accept the inequality he 
discusses, and therefore continues his analysis of the lex talionis under the assumption that those 
sentenced to death are fully responsible for their crimes.162 
In contrast to these philosophical discussions of the death penalty, Friedrich Nietzsche 
argues that punishment originated as a mechanism to preserve conscience, and that it evolved 
according to the historical relationship between a creditor and a debtor. Further, humans gain 
pleasure from inflicting or witnessing punishment. Nietzsche also asserts that punishment has not 
served a single purpose throughout history, but instead has consistently been manipulated to 
serve different power structures. Nietzsche outlines his theory of punishment in On the 
Genealogy of Morality while examining the origin of “bad conscience,” or guilt. He states that 
man’s responsibility has become “his dominant instinct” and that this instinct is his 
conscience.163 In order to preserve conscience, and therefore, lawfulness, society exacts 
punishments upon the unlawful, creating “a memory… with dreadful methods.”164 When harsh 
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or extreme punishments are implemented, the individual’s conscience is reinforced by these 
reminders.165 Therefore, in Nietzsche’s view, punishment functions as a tool that creates 
responsible, conscientious subjects.  
Nietzsche contends that the punishment which reinforces conscience emerged from the 
relationship between a creditor and a debtor. Punishment, he states, did not evolve according to 
theories of “freedom or lack of freedom of the will,” but instead originated as retribution.166 
Offenders are punished due to society’s anger and desire for vengeance; the idea that the 
criminal can atone for his crimes by suffering an equivalent injury.167 This “equivalence between 
injury and pain” stems from the contractual agreement between a creditor and a debtor.168 
According to this agreement, a debtor borrows from a creditor and promises to repay the creditor 
at a specified time. If the debtor fails to repay the borrowed sum, “the creditor could inflict all 
kinds of dishonour and torture on the body of the debtor.”169 In the past, creditors were legally 
allowed to personally punish their debtors, while today, the creditor and debtor relationship is 
echoed in the relationship between a government and its demos.  
As a creditor, a government grants its demos certain benefits, while the demos are 
expected to behave lawfully in return. Nietzsche argues that the criminal is a debtor who “not 
only fails to repay the benefits and advances granted to him, but also actually assaults the 
creditor.”170 Through punishment, the lawbreaker is reminded of the importance of the societal 
benefits he has rejected by his crimes. According to Nietzsche, this punishment is “a copy… of 
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normal behavior towards a hated, disarmed enemy who has been defeated,” functioning as a 
legalized act of anger and vengeance in the same manner as the punishment the creditor inflicts 
on the debtor.171 However, as a society becomes more powerful, criminals are no longer 
subjected to the anger of the public, nor are they exiled.172 Instead, because they are no longer as 
“dangerous and destabilizing for the survival of the whole,” lawbreakers are shielded from the 
anger of the injured party while compensating for their crimes with equivalent punishments.173 
Therefore, as a community gains influence and confidence, “its penal law becomes more 
lenient,” while a reduction in power will result in more severe punishments.174 
The equivalence between injury and pain that guides Nietzsche’s theory of punishment 
satisfies both the creditor and the government because, as he argues, individuals gain pleasure 
from punishing others or from witnessing their punishment. The creditor and the government are 
compensated with “the pleasure of having the right to exercise power over the powerless without 
a thought.”175 This “pleasure in its highest form” stems not only from the exercise of power, but 
also from the knowledge that the creditor suffers intense pain.176 Members of the public 
experience this enjoyment whether they, as creditors, implement the punishment, or whether they 
observe their debtors being punished by the government.177 Therefore, Nietzsche posits that the 
moral virtues of debt, conscience, and duty “all began with a thorough and prolonged 
bloodletting.”178 In order to justify this impulse for vengeance, individuals view it as a natural 
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human tendency.179 However, Nietzsche asserts that justice can never be accomplished through 
this punishment stemming from anger and revenge, stating, “the last territory to be conquered by 
the spirit of justice is that of reactive sentiment!”180 An established legal code makes possible a 
move in the direction of impersonal, objective justice by making punishment the duty of the state 
rather than the injured party, but cannot fully accomplish objective justice.181 
 After explaining his theory of punishment, Nietzsche maintains that punishment has not 
served a single purpose throughout history, but instead has been shifted and manipulated to serve 
a variety of purposes. The purpose of punishment at its origins and its modern application are 
entirely separate, as “anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually 
interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power 
superior to it.”182 Further, punishment did not evolve for the purpose of punishing; instead, the 
purpose emerges from the practice.183 Therefore, the many shifts and changes in punishment do 
not represent a linear progress towards a defined goal, but instead are “mutually independent 
processes of subjugation” exercised as power directed at a vast array of different individuals and 
groups.184 Finally, the procedure of punishment is not tailored to fit one official purpose, but 
instead can be utilized and adapted to a variety of purposes.185 
 Though Nietzsche does not specifically mention the death penalty in his discussion of 
punishment, it is clear that executing a criminal represents a debtor paying the ultimate price to a 
governing creditor. Further, it is impossible to separate the legal purpose of punishment from the 
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race and class discrimination inherent in the application of capital punishment, which indicates 
American society’s desire to exercise their vengeance upon these less powerful groups. I believe 
that Nietzsche’s theory of punishment can be applied to begin to explain why the United States 
government continues to practice capital punishment despite its inconsistencies, discrimination, 
injustice, and lack of deterrence. Both Michel Foucault and William Connolly use Nietzsche’s 
theories in their analyses of capital punishment. Connolly draws from Nietzsche’s assertion that 
humans seek revenge through punishment, and Foucault expands Nietzsche’s theory that 
punishment has no single purpose and instead functions as a tool of power.  
Michel Foucault’s theory of power shapes his conception of punishment. Foucault views 
the dominant forms of power utilized by the modern state as a complex network of forces that 
produces subjects. Punishment, therefore, is a manifestation of “general forces in society that 
reflect the dominant forms of social and political power;” it is a tool of power used to create 
subjects obedient to the requisites of the state.186 Unlike Kant, Hegel, and Van Den Haag, who 
discuss capital punishment in abstract, theoretical terms, Foucault does not articulate a single 
central theory of punishment. Instead, he examines “practices” in order to answer the question 
“how does one punish?”187 In order to do this, Foucault utilizes a historical approach to examine 
how governments exercise power through punishment. According to Foucault, one must 
demonstrate the inherent problems within “falsely self-evident” punishment by exploring its 
connections with “a multiplicity of historical processes.”188 For Foucault, punishment serves a 
variety of purposes and moral principles that shift over historical periods and across societies, a 
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clear continuation of Nietzsche’s theory of the shifting purposes of punishment. These historical 
shifts must be examined in order to understand the modern purpose and method of punishment.  
 In this method of analysis, Foucault considers which individuals receive punishment, and 
which do not, and also how punishment is implemented. In accordance with his theory of 
resistance to create space for individual freedom, Foucault believes that punishment as an 
institution can be challenged and transformed.189 When discussing capital punishment 
specifically, Foucault objects to “any justification of the practice of punishment,” believing that 
the practice of punishment is not driven by the rational pursuit of justice, but instead by the 
desire to exert power over and subordinate others.190 Therefore, Foucault rejects not only the 
death penalty, but any form of indefinite punishment, asserting that abolishing the death penalty 
while leaving life sentences intact “merely shifts but otherwise leaves unaltered the nature and 
locus of the power wielded over criminals by society.”191 However, in his critique Foucault does 
not offer his conception of alternative punishments or a program to abolish the death penalty. He 
believes that critique is not necessarily programmatic, but instead serves as “a challenge to what 
is.”192 Therefore, in my reading of Foucault, he intends for others to employ his methods and 
critique to take action to challenge norms of punishment.  
Foucault uses this historical, context-driven method of analyzing punishment in 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. In “Generalized Punishment,” Foucault discusses 
eighteenth-century reforms of punishment. During this time period, reformers determined that 
“instead of taking revenge, criminal justice should simply punish,” and supported a departure 
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from overtly harsh and violent forms of punishment.193 However, this reform was not conceived 
due to a “new respect for the humanity of the condemned,” but instead was developed “as a 
tendency towards a more finely tuned justice,” to punish more effectively and to utilize the 
power to punish as a more efficient mechanism of control.194 Foucault writes that these reforms 
were a “rearrangement of the power to punish” to make it more effective, influential, and 
universal, “[inserting] the power to punish more deeply into the social body.”195 Advances in 
technology and the embrace of capitalism drove “the shift from a criminality of blood to a 
criminality of fraud,” meaning a shift from criminalizing isolated acts of violence to 
criminalizing thefts of property, which resulted in stricter surveillance and guaranteed 
punishments for crimes that had previously been ignored.196 Punishment was divided into two 
classifications of crimes: the “illegality of property,” crimes of theft and violence for which the 
lower classes were harshly policed and punished, and the “illegality of rights,” crimes of 
economic manipulation and fraud for which the bourgeoisie were able to evade punishment.197 
The image of the criminal as a violent, depraved monster also emerged at this time, coupled with 
preventative tactics to deter potential future criminals.198 
 In “The Gentle Way in Punishment,” Foucault analyzes reforms in punishment that 
resulted in imprisonment as a generalized punishment for all crimes. He states that the shift from 
retributive punishments and forced labor as punishment to imprisonment came about in order to 
mitigate the capricious power of the sovereign. Imprisonment made the criminal “the property of 
society” rather than that of the sovereign, enabling him to serve a “purely moral, but much more 
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real utility” as a deterrent to potential future criminals.199 Foucault distinguishes retributive 
punishment and imprisonment in terms of “the relation [the punishment] establishes with the 
body and with the soul,” analyzing how each punishment controls individuals by subjecting them 
to power.200 While the mechanism of retributive punishment was to exact justice by 
implementing a representation of the offender’s crime, the point of impact of imprisonment was 
both the body and the soul of the criminal.201 Imprisonment constantly subjected the criminal to 
structured authority in order to render him an obedient subject, while simultaneously “forming 
obedient individuals” in society by the criminal’s example.202 By detailing and analyzing the 
history of the reform of punishment, Foucault provides both context and method for a modern 
analysis of punishment generally and capital punishment specifically.  
Foucault also uses this historical method of analyzing punishment to examine the state’s 
power of death in The History of Sexuality. According to Michael Meranze and Adam 
Thurschwell, Foucault analyzes the shift from “an overtly juridical to an increasingly bio-
political” state, charting the negative or positive power the state exercised over the lives of the 
demos.203 In the historical sovereign state, the ruler possessed the power to take the lives of his 
citizens, whether “at the scaffold or on the battlefield.”204 However, this was a negative power, 
as the sovereign could take away the lives of his subjects, but was unable to improve them.205 In 
contrast, the modern bio-political state exercises the positive power to enhance the lives of the 
demos. Therefore, capital punishment is justified by the argument that it “serves the preservation 
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of life itself:” eliminating criminal individuals is necessary to ensure the wellbeing of the general 
population.206 Foucault argues that the racist and classist characterization of criminals as 
irredeemable monsters “[allows] violence to be leveled in the name of security without 
undermining” the productive, bio-political state.207 Although the state no longer wields absolute 
power, Foucault argues that through the continued application of capital punishment, not to 
mention conscription for military service and police killings, it still possesses the sovereign 
power to kill its citizens.208 Thus, in my reading of Foucault, the death penalty has historically 
operated as and continues to be a transformative tool of the state’s power, justified today by 
racist and classist impulses.  
Foucault also uses this method of analysis to discuss capital punishment as a 
manifestation of power in three essays: “Pompidou’s Two Deaths,” “The Proper Use of 
Criminals,” and “Against Replacement Penalties.” In “Pompidou’s Two Deaths,” Foucault 
analyzes the sentencing and execution of Buffet and Bontemps, incarcerated men who 
committed two murders in an escape attempt. Buffet and Bontemps were sentenced to death; 
when President Pompidou refused their appeal, they were subsequently executed.209 Though the 
majority of French citizens at the time supported capital punishment, Foucault argues that 
Pompidou did not refuse Buffet’s and Bontemps’ appeal out of “faithfulness to the nation’s 
majority impulse.”210 Instead, Pompidou was exercising his power, demonstrating that he was “a 
tough, uncompromising man…” unafraid to adopt “the most violent and reactionary 
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elements.”211 Thus, Pompidou was not motivated by responsiveness to the demos, but was 
instead demonstrating his willingness to authorize the most terrible punishment by refusing to 
pardon Buffet and Bontemps. In my reading of Foucault, Pompidou was unconsciously taking 
pleasure in subordinating others and creating obedient subjects in taking this action.  
 Foucault further expands upon the desire to impose capital punishment as a tool of power 
in “The Proper Use of Criminals.” In this essay, he argues that the French penitentiary system 
punishes criminals rather than crimes. The criminal becomes the subject of public passion and 
vitriol; it is he “for whom the penalty and oblivion will be demanded.”212 To impose punishment, 
the justice system also considers the supposed nature of the criminal rather than the crimes he is 
convicted of. Foucault states that the criminal’s perceived character will determine whether the 
justice system “understands and excuses him” or acts with severity, imposing a death 
sentence.213 To illustrate this, Foucault distinguishes between two cases, one in which a man was 
accused of brutally murdering a young girl, and another in which business owners’ negligence in 
producing talcum powder resulted in the deaths of several children. Society, Foucault asserts, 
views the negligent business owners as “unscrupulous manufacturers, greedy or cynical 
businessmen, or incompetent engineers,” but they are never coded as “criminals” and therefore, 
never sentenced to death.214 Conversely, though the conviction of the accused murderer rested on 
dubious evidence, he was viewed as “fundamentally a “criminal,” essentially a “danger,” and 
naturally a monster:” in other words, he was a man so morally depraved that he had to be 
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sentenced to death.215 In effect, the “modern… principle that one must judge not crimes but 
criminals” preserves capital punishment because it allows the penitentiary system to continue 
manipulating power in order to subjugate those they label irredeemable.216 Therefore, Foucault 
sees capital punishment as a tool of power which reflects and furthers inequality and class 
discrimination in French society.  
 In “Against Replacement Penalties,” Foucault details his analysis of the injustice of 
irreversible punishments. Emphasizing the role of capital punishment as a manifestation of 
power, Foucault maintains that throughout history, the death penalty has endured as a form of 
sovereign power that represented “the exercise of a right of life and death over individuals.”217 
Though it would be simple to abolish the death penalty in order to conform with other civilized 
nations or to avoid executing innocents, it would be much more difficult to do so based on the 
principle that the state lacks the authority to take citizens’ lives.218 In order to abolish capital 
punishment while also causing the “beginning of a new political reflection,” the state’s “right to 
kill” must be abolished as well, creating freedom by clearly “defining the relations of individual 
freedom and the death of individuals.”219  
 However, Foucault maintains that imposing sentences of life in prison in lieu of capital 
punishment does little to destroy the state’s subjugation of citizens through punishment and “the 
right to kill.” Foucault argues that the penal system has historically divided criminals into two 
categories: those who can be rehabilitated through prison sentences, and those who are 
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irredeemable “even if… punished indefinitely” and must be sentenced to death.220 The penal 
system therefore assumes that the latter category of criminals must be sentenced to death, a 
definitive punishment.221 Foucault recognizes that a sentence of life in prison is also essentially 
definitive. He predicts that even after the death penalty is abolished, debate will continue over 
whether to impose the second definitive sentence of life in prison, critiquing a penal system 
which “asserts that it is for the purpose of correction but maintains that certain individuals cannot 
be corrected, ever, ...because they are, in sum, intrinsically dangerous.”222 Foucault states that if 
a society continues to impose the definitive sentence of life in prison, it “maintains, in one form 
or another, the category of individuals to be definitively eliminated” rather than continually 
questioning its own penal system and reforming it to prevent abuses of power.223 The greater 
danger, Foucault maintains, is a society which “gives oneself the illusion of solving the most 
difficult problems” by keeping open “the trapdoor through which the “incorrigible” will 
disappear.”224 If a society abolishes capital punishment but substitutes life sentences, the society 
continues to view criminals as irredeemable monsters, and therefore this norm of punishment has 
not been questioned or resisted. Instead, Foucault believes that a society should analyze and 
reconstruct its norms of punishment.  
 I find that Foucault’s historical, context-driven method of analyzing is useful for several 
reasons. First, rather than accepting a single conception of punishment or of justice, as Hegel, 
Kant, and Van Den Haag do, Foucault’s method necessitates an examination of context to 
determine how punishment functions as a practice in a given time and place. Foucault discusses 
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the practice of punishment and its implications rather than espousing abstract philosophical 
theories. Second, Foucault’s constant questioning of the function and purpose of punishment, as 
well as his analysis of power and resistance, offers a method in which capital punishment may be 
criticized, threatened, transformed, or abolished. Though I find Foucault’s refusal to articulate a 
single theory of punishment frustrating, I find his method helpful in organizing my own thoughts 
on punishment. In order to analyze the way in which the United States government creates and 
controls subjects through punishment as a form of power, I believe that questions of racial and 
class inequality must be examined, as well as a discussion of what I perceive to be an 
unforgiving and retribution-driven legal system. American capital punishment accomplishes 
neither justice nor deterrence, yet it continues to be implemented, and a Foucauldian analysis 
would begin to discern its actual purposes, as well as effective modes of resistance. William E. 
Connolly also applies Foucault’s method of analyzing punishment to create his own account of 
the death penalty, examining issues of racial bias and revenge.  
In “The Desire to Punish,” an essay within The Ethos of Pluralization, William E. 
Connolly responds to the perspectives of Foucault and Girard in order to build his own theory of 
society’s will to punish criminal acts. Though Connolly does not specifically address capital 
punishment in his discussion, his analysis of punishment is applicable to the death penalty. 
Connolly’s analysis provides an interpretation of why American society accepts and endorses 
capital punishment. This reason, Connolly argues, is the deep drive for revenge salient within 
and between all social classes. In this argument, Connolly clearly draws from Nietzsche’s theory 
that individuals exact punishment for vengeance and enjoy witnessing the punishment of others.  
He begins this discussion by stating that the five purported purposes of punishment, which are 
protection, deterrence, responsibility, justice, and rehabilitation, “do not mesh well together,” as 
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“the underlying conceptions grounding each are contestable.”225 Despite these inconsistencies, 
American society clings to the desire to exact revenge against both criminals and disadvantaged 
communities of color, “whose conditions of existence disturb the practices of fairness, neutrality, 
impartiality, and responsibility said to govern everyone.”226 Some even seek revenge against the 
world itself, and use an already underprivileged group, such as African-American males, as a 
“paradigmatic substitute.”  Therefore, punishment in the American criminal justice system 
provides a legal avenue for individuals to seek revenge against threatening agents.227 
 This drive to punish in order to seek revenge classifies individuals as either responsible 
agents or irredeemable monsters, but ignores the pathways of desire that run between and 
through these two categories. Of these “abstract categories of people,” one is “a responsible 
offender who deserves what he gets,” while the other is “a dangerous monster who must be 
destroyed or interned permanently.”228 In reality, these two categories are ambiguous, often 
blurring into one another, but this ambiguity must be preserved and concealed in order to 
maintain them.229 By assigning the potential targets of punishment to one or the other of these 
categories, society disregards the effect desire has on punishment and the drive to revenge. 
Connolly cautions that “no single model of causality… [can] negotiate this terrain,” but states 
that once individuals are aware of the effects of their desire, they are then “enabled and inspired 
to modify the shape of desire” to create a more just and balanced system of punishment.230 
 Connolly describes Girard’s theory of desire, then incorporates his own interpretation of 
desire, creating a new analysis that is applicable to the American drive to punish. Girard 
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describes desire as “a triangular relation between a fractured subject, a model, and an object 
already desired by the model,” in which the subject desires the object in part because the model, 
his rival, possesses it.231 The subject does not simply desire the object, but instead craves the 
“fullness of being” that the model seems to possess. However, because even the model cannot 
truly realize this wholeness, the subject’s “uncertainty and incompleteness” is left unresolved, 
and “desire keeps moving.”232 In Girard’s view, this pathway of desire inevitably leads to 
rivalries, as “models eventually feel threatened by the privileged status they receive, and by the 
intense desire of disciples to attain the objects they prize the most.”233 In order to explain this 
chaotic pattern of desire and violence, society designates scapegoats, who are held responsible 
for “the deceits, revenge, and violence built into escalating rivalries of desire.”234 This discussion 
of scapegoats can be connected to Foucault’s analysis of criminals labelled irredeemable 
monsters.  
However, Connolly critiques Girard’s theory of desire because it disregards certain 
important considerations which enable individuals to move past the cycle of rivalry and revenge. 
By incorporating these considerations, Connolly articulates a new account of desire which helps 
to explain society’s desire to punish. Connolly states that Girard’s perspective is flawed because 
he fails to consider different types or intensities of desire, which create a “dimension of mobility 
and uncertainty in the element of desire;” these different types and intensities depend on the 
model who possesses the object.235 One reason that the subject desires a certain object is because 
a particular model possesses it, and therefore the subject cannot achieve his desire and possess 
the object without removing a reason for his desire. If the subject can recognize that achieving 
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his desire and taking the place of the model would remove a source of the desire itself, he is then 
able to revise and resist his own desires.236  
Connolly identifies another weakness in Girard’s theory as his failure to acknowledge the 
“collectivities” inherent in desire. Citing Wendy Brown, Connolly explains that the lifestyle of 
the middle class is upheld as a model of desire which “depoliticizes constituencies in subordinate 
class positions.”237 Disadvantaged individuals, especially people of color, simultaneously desire 
and resent this white, middle-class ideal, which defines them “as a racially marked constituency 
whose demands foreclose otherwise viable possibilities.”238 This perspective may incite these 
individuals to engage in criminal behavior, allowing them to possess a type of freedom which 
allows them to resist and therefore transcend their circumstances.239 The white elites who judge 
and sentence these young men of color are motivated by their own desire to punish this 
disadvantaged class, meaning that “the prison as site of correction is overlaid by the prison as 
site of revenge.”240 
Connolly examines how this new theory of desire applies to the drive to punish and seek 
revenge. When the disadvantaged subjects of desire are unable to achieve the false wholeness 
that the model appears to possess, their resulting resentment “can grow into a subterranean will 
to revenge… aimed at any constituency whose way of being calls the naturalness or superiority 
of your identity into question.”241 The traditional American image of responsible, rational 
middle-class individuals is perpetuated by defining these identities as natural and whole while 
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simultaneously stifling conduct that undermines this ideal.242 Perpetuating this model leads to the 
categorization of people convicted of crimes, defining them as “either responsible agents 
deserving punishment or unstable beings,” thereby implicitly permitting revenge.243 Society 
overlooks disadvantaged communities to preserve this “appearance of integrity and cleanliness,” 
failing to address and rectify this “sacrifice of entire constituencies to stabilize uncertain cultural 
practices.”244 Thus, it is not only these underprivileged communities that seek revenge against 
the white middle-class model, but the white middle-class that exacts revenge on these less 
powerful groups to retain their “culturally congealed identities.”245 
Connolly then explores the pathway society might take to destroy these arbitrary 
categories and class distinctions, creating a more just and proportionate system of punishment. 
Individuals must first acknowledge that they “are not sovereign agents who will the codes of 
desire that circulates through us” in order to leave behind these distinct categories, sacrificing 
“the appearance of equivalence to work on the call to revenge within the desire to punish.”246 
Once individuals are aware of the pathway of their desire, they are then better able to identify 
their own flawed perspectives and desires and work to change them, engaging in “micropolitics 
of action on the self.”247 Individuals must “work on specific contingencies” in themselves, which 
allows them to respond to “the crucial role of contingency in identity and desire.”248 This new 
awareness “opens up new possibilities of ethical responsiveness to difference,” creating a system 
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of punishment that is more fair and balanced.249 Therefore, by examining and becoming aware of 
our biases, we are able to resist them and implement punishment in a more just manner.  
In my view, Connolly’s analysis of punishment, revenge, and desire necessarily leads to 
abolishing the death penalty, or at least narrowing it substantially. If criminals are driven to 
commit violent acts due to the identity forced upon them by white middle-class society, and by 
their desire to possess the apparent fullness that this class is perceived to hold, they cannot be 
held fully responsible for their actions and thus should not be subject to the highest form of 
punishment. Further, since those who exact death sentences against them are inevitably affected 
by their own desire to exact revenge against a nonconforming class, they cannot impose 
sentences justly or logically. However, Connolly’s proposed method to rectify this system of 
punishment is flawed. The white middle class exacting these punishments against communities 
of color benefits from their identity as a model in society. Even if these individuals were to 
recognize their own flawed desires, they have no motivation save morality to change their 
behavior. Therefore, though Connolly’s analysis of desire and punishment sufficiently explains 
American acceptance of capital punishment and clearly articulates a reason to abolish it, 
eliminating the death penalty would be difficult to accomplish through the “work by the self on 
the self” that Connolly advocates.  
In my view, the true purpose of the inconsistent American death penalty is neither 
deterrence nor retribution, but the revenge, vengeance, and discrimination that both Nietzsche 
and Connolly describe. If the American death penalty is to be abolished and a more just penal 
system created, it must be analyzed, criticized, and resisted according to the framework of the 
theories discussed in this chapter. The fourth chapter of this thesis will briefly discuss seven 
pivotal death penalty cases in terms of both their constitutional holdings and the theoretical 
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structure of their arguments in order to determine which theories the Supreme Court of the 
United States accepts, and which they deny.  
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Chapter IV: Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
 In the first three chapters of this thesis, I have outlined the most influential theories 
surrounding the American death penalty. However, it is not theorists who determine whether 
capital punishment will continue to be applied, but the rulings of the Supreme Court of the 
United States. Therefore, in this chapter, I will analyze five influential death penalty cases and 
determine what, if any, theories the Court has accepted or rejected in its capital punishment 
jurisprudence. These cases are Furman v. Georgia (1972), Gregg v. Georgia (1978), McCleskey 
v. Kemp (1987), Ford v. Wainwright (1986), and Atkins v. Virginia (2002). I will examine these 
particular cases because they all demonstrate points at which the Court examined the 
constitutionality of the death penalty in specific instances. Therefore, these cases will reveal 
points at which the Court analyzed and critiqued the death penalty, which would facilitate the use 
of political theory. I selected these five cases because they provide a summarization of the 
Court’s contemporary analysis of the death penalty, while reflecting almost all of the theories I 
discussed in the first three chapters. When analyzing these cases, I will first detail the facts of the 
case, then discuss the majority opinion and any relevant concurrences and dissents. I will then 
analyze the Court’s substantive assessment of the death penalty, connecting this argument with 
theories from the first three chapters.  This will enable me to determine, in the conclusion of this 
thesis, what the Supreme Court’s theoretical view of the death penalty is, whether it is consistent, 
and whether it may lead to completely abolishing capital punishment, either by gradual reform or 
constitutional ruling, in the future. 
In Furman v. Georgia (1972), the Court examined both the unequal application of the 
American death penalty under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and also the constitutionality of capital punishment on its face. The case involved 
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three African-American men who were convicted of separate crimes in state courts and 
sentenced to death in trials by jury. William Furman was convicted of murder in Georgia, while 
Lucious Jackson and Elmer Branch were convicted of rape in Georgia and Texas, respectively.250 
After the cases were unsuccessfully appealed in state supreme courts, the Supreme Court of the 
United States granted cert, meaning that it agreed to review the cases, and consolidated the three 
cases.251 In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the 
cases for further proceedings, holding that the imposition of the death penalty in the three cases 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The Court issued a brief per curiam opinion followed by separate concurrences authored by 
Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall, while Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist wrote dissents.252 The Furman decision induced a ten-
year moratorium on capital punishment in the United States, and caused several states to adopt 
legislation requiring juries to consider aggravating and mitigating factors when imposing death 
sentences.253 
The five justices in the majority could not come to a consensus in their arguments on the 
unconstitutionality of capital punishment. While Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White argue that 
capital punishment is unconstitutional in this specific case, because arbitrary sentencing violates 
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justices Brennan and 
Marshall maintain that the death penalty is unconstitutional on its face “due to its severity, 
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finality, excessiveness, and denial of human dignity.”254 The concurrences by Justices Douglas 
and Brennan use arguments similar to specific theories discussed in the first three chapters of this 
thesis. Justice Douglas’ concurrence posits that the death penalty is unconstitutional because it is 
unequally applied to the underprivileged, particularly African-Americans, and therefore violates 
the Fourteenth Amendment.255 Douglas’ concurrence thus uses arguments similar to Connolly’s 
analysis of punishment, which states that punishment is used as a tool to persecute outsiders, 
specifically those who are impoverished and black.256 Justice Brennan’s concurrence maintains 
that the death penalty is unconstitutional in all circumstances because it violates human 
dignity.257 His arguments are similar to the Foucauldian theory that the death penalty is a tool of 
power used to eliminate unwanted members of society.258259 Additionally, both Douglas and 
Brennan rely upon jurisprudence from Trop v. Dulles (1958), which is theoretically similar to 
Reiman’s theory that abolishing the death penalty is necessary to serve the advancement of 
civilization.260 
In his concurrence, Justice Douglas argues that the death penalty is violative of both the 
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment as applied to the states through 
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment because it is 
discriminatorily applied to African-American defendants.261 Douglas both cites Louisiana ex rel. 
Francis v. Resweber (1947) and briefly discusses the history of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
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establish that the amendment’s protection of “privileges or immunities of citizens” prohibits 
cruel and unusual punishment.262 He then cites Trop v. Dulles (1958), in which the Court held 
that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society,” meaning that both the viewpoints of society and the 
practice of punishment in context may shape the Court’s surmisation of what punishments are 
cruel and unusual.263 Therefore, Douglas states that despite the supposed validity of a law 
prescribing capital punishment, the application of the law may be unconstitutional. This 
unconstitutional application could arise if the defendant was sentenced based upon “his race, 
religion, social position, or class” or if the sentencing procedures “[gave] room for the play of 
such prejudices.”264 
Douglas then details the origin and implications of the American proscription against 
cruel and unusual punishment by examining the English Bill of Rights. He states that the history 
of this clause indicates that it is cruel and unusual to apply punishment “selectively to minorities 
whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of society, and who are unpopular,” while 
simultaneously refusing to apply the same punishment generally to all members of society.265 
Further, the authors of the Eighth Amendment demonstrated their “desire for equality” in 
punishment when proscribing cruel and unusual punishment.266 Thus, because the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits unequal and discriminatory punishment, Douglas asserts that the 
application of the American death penalty is unconstitutional because impoverished, African-
American defendants are disproportionately sentenced to death.267 Although the prohibition 
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against cruel and unusual punishment requires legislation that is “evenhanded, nonselective, and 
nonarbitrary,” these laws are still applied discriminatorily due to the unregulated discretion of 
judges and juries in sentencing.268 Justice Douglas maintains that the selective application of the 
death penalty “feeds prejudices against the accused if he is poor or despised” while protecting 
those who are white and affluent, and concludes that the Georgia and Texas statutes under which 
Furman, Jackson, and Branch were sentenced are unconstitutional in practice.269 However, he 
does not evaluate the constitutionality of the death penalty generally.270 
In arguing that the application of the American death penalty is unconstitutional because 
it targets impoverished minorities, particularly African-Americans, Douglas makes an argument 
that aligns with Connolly’s analysis of punishment. Connolly asserts that punishment is driven 
by prejudice and is exacted in order to get revenge against disliked minorities. He states that this 
practice of punishment classifies white, affluent Americans as responsible, rational individuals 
and implicitly allows them to exact revenge on the disadvantaged and black defendants “whose 
way of being calls the naturalness or superiority of [their] identity into question.”271 By 
acknowledging the racial and class prejudice inherent in American capital punishment, Justice 
Douglas makes an argument analogous to Connolly, as both conclude that the judges and juries 
responsible for sentencing view African-Americans as dangerous outsiders who must be 
eliminated.272 However, while Connolly believes that this view of punishment will allow 
individuals to become aware of their desires and establish a more just system of punishment, 
Douglas merely concludes that certain laws are unconstitutional if applied in a discriminatory 
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manner.273 In terms of other theories, Douglas’ use of a quotation from Trop makes a similar 
argument to Reiman, who stated that abolishing painful punishments such as the death penalty 
allows society to mature and progress.274 By citing historical examples and evaluating the 
application of the death penalty rather than focusing on the punishment abstractly, Douglas also 
analyzes the death penalty in the manner of Foucault, who believes that punishment must be 
evaluated in terms of its practice and historical context.275 
Unlike Justice Douglas, Justice Brennan argues that the death penalty is facially 
unconstitutional in his concurrence. He maintains that punishments which do not comport with 
human dignity are cruel and unusual, and then asserts that the death penalty is cruel and unusual 
because it violates human dignity.276 Brennan begins his concurrence by examining the history of 
the Eighth Amendment in order to determine the scope of the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment.277 This historical analysis shows that the framers established this clause in 
order to check the power of the legislature, which would otherwise “have had the unfettered 
power to prescribe punishments for crimes.”278 Though the framers originally intended to ban 
torture as a punishment, Brennan states that they meant for the clause to evolve, proscribing 
other punishments considered cruel and unusual in the future.279 He supports this assertion by 
citing Weems v. United States (1910), in which the Court determined that the cruel and unusual 
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punishment clause should shift with society to forbid punishments beyond those considered cruel 
and unusual at its conception.280 
Brennan then details four principles which he believes are inherent in the cruel and 
unusual punishment clause. If a punishment infringes these principles, then it violates the clause 
and is unconstitutional; under this test, capital punishment is cruel and unusual.281 The first 
principle is that the cruel and unusual punishment clause bans punishments which are so severe 
that they “[do] not comport with human dignity.”282 The clause recognizes “even the vilest 
criminals” as dignified members of the human community, and punishments which “treat 
members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded” are cruel 
and unusual.283 Capital punishment violates this principle because it is unusually severe “in its 
pain, in its finality, and in its enormity.”284 Further, Brennan maintains that the state denies a 
defendant’s humanity when imposing capital punishment; in contrast with an individual in 
prison, who retains some constitutional rights and “remains a member of the human family,” the 
executed person is unable to appeal his sentence and redeem himself because of the 
definitiveness of death. In effect, as the Court stated in Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), the 
individual sentenced to death is no longer “fit for this world.”285 
The second principle inherent in the cruel and unusual punishment clause is that the state 
may not arbitrarily inflict a severe punishment upon some individuals while refusing to impose it 
in all circumstances.286 Brennan states that the death penalty violates this principle due to its 
infrequent application, as it is only inflicted “in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally 
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available.”287 The third principle is that a punishment must be acceptable to contemporary 
society. If society disapproves of a punishment, then that punishment likely does not respect 
human dignity.288 Brennan asserts that contemporary society rejects the death penalty and 
therefore violates this principle. This rejection, he argues, is evident both in the decline in and 
rarity of the infliction of capital punishment and in the moral discomfort with executing members 
of a society which values “the dignity of the individual” above all else.289 In fact, Brennan posits, 
it is possible that capital punishment only continues to be tolerated by society because it is 
imposed so infrequently.290  
The final principle inherent in the cruel and unusual punishment clause is that a penalty 
must not be excessive, as a punishment which inflicts unnecessary suffering certainly does not 
respect human dignity.291 Brennan states that if a less severe punishment could meet the same 
penal purposes, the punishment is excessive and therefore cruel and unusual.292 The death 
penalty violates this principle because it does not accomplish deterrence and because a less 
severe penalty would satisfy the desire for retributive justice. In terms of deterrence, Brennan 
cites statistics which demonstrate that the death penalty does not deter future criminals, and 
states that even if the punishment could deter, it would only deter “those who think rationally 
about the commission of capital crimes.”293 At this point, Brennan critiques abstract theories of 
deterrence, stating that he seeks to analyze “the practice of punishing criminals by death as it 
exists in the United States today.”294 In terms of retribution, Brennan argues that society’s desire 
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for this form of justice can be met with imprisonment, as “the overwhelming number of 
criminals who commit capital crimes go to prison” rather than being executed.295 Therefore, 
because the death penalty violates all four principles implicit in the cruel and unusual 
punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, Brennan concludes that the punishment is 
unconstitutional in all circumstances.296 
In his concurrence, Brennan makes several arguments that align with the theories 
discussed in the first three chapters of this thesis. First, his assertion that a punishment is cruel 
and unusual if it does not comport with human dignity is similar to Foucault’s analysis of the 
death penalty, which sees the punishment as a means of definitively eliminating outsiders from 
society. According to Foucault, the state views some defendants as irredeemable monsters who 
cannot be rehabilitated “even if… punished indefinitely” and therefore removes them from 
society by executing them.297 By asserting that the death penalty is cruel and unusual because it 
does not respect human dignity, I find that Brennan makes a Foucauldian argument. Like 
Foucault, who views the death penalty as a definitive punishment for the “incorrigible,” Brennan 
believes that capital punishment is severe due to its finality and because it eliminates those who 
are “not fit for this world.”298 However, unlike Brennan, who believes that life imprisonment 
respects an individual’s human dignity, Foucault maintains that all definitive punishments, 
including life imprisonment, “maintain...  the category of individuals to be definitively 
eliminated” by removing outsiders from society.299 In addition to his Foucauldian view of the 
finality of capital punishment, Brennan also employs Foucauldian methods when discussing 
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deterrence. Rather than presenting abstract theories about the potential deterrent effect of the 
capital punishment, Brennan analyzes the practice of the contemporary death penalty, and 
therefore uses Foucault’s context-driven method of examining punishment.300 
Brennan’s argument that punishment should evolve to fit society’s standards is similar to 
Reiman’s theory that abolishing the death penalty enables society to improve and mature. 
According to Brennan, the third principle inherent in the cruel and unusual punishment clause is 
that punishment should shift in order to be acceptable to contemporary society. This argument 
aligns with Reiman’s theory that painful punishments like the death penalty should be abolished 
in order to enable the maturation and civilization of society.301 Finally, in asserting that capital 
punishment could only deter individuals who rationally determine whether to commit crimes, 
Brennan makes an argument similar to Conrad’s theory of deterrence, which states that 
“common sense is the wisdom of the common man” rather than the irrational individual who 
commits violent crimes.302 
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist rely upon past 
jurisprudence and the historical role of the Court in their dissents rather than utilizing theoretical 
analyses. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger states that since the enactment of the Eighth 
Amendment, “not a single decision of this Court has cast the slightest shadow of a doubt on the 
constitutionality of capital punishment.”303 Further, all four dissenters maintain that the Court 
oversteps its constitutional boundaries by interfering with capital punishment, a power which 
should be left to the legislative branch and to the states. Both Powell and Rehnquist write that the 
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Court must exercise “judicial self-restraint” when evaluating the death penalty.304 However, in 
his dissent, Powell briefly “justifies capital punishment on a theory of society’s retribution,” in a 
manner which is similar to Kant and Hegel’s theories of retributive justice.305306 In my view, 
Powell’s dissent also demonstrates the validity of Nietzsche’s discussion of punishment as a 
mechanism for revenge.307  
Justice Powell briefly discusses the role of retributive justice in his dissent, analyzing past 
jurisprudence to determine that the Court does not reject retribution as a goal of capital 
punishment. Powell states that although contemporary critics view retribution as immoral, the 
Court has “acknowledged the existence of a retributive element in criminal sanctions and has 
never… found it impermissible.”308 He cites Justice Marshall’s plurality opinion in Powell v. 
Texas (1968), in which Marshall argued that the Constitution does not require punishment to 
serve merely rehabilitative or therapeutic purposes.309 Further, Powell maintains that retribution 
as a goal of punishment has widespread public support because it reflects society’s revulsion for 
violent criminal acts. He quotes Justice Denning, a British High Court Judge who argued that 
“some crimes are so outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrong-
doer deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not,” and concludes that society 
naturally demands retributive justice when violent crimes are committed.310  
Powell’s discussion of retribution as a purpose of capital punishment aligns with Kant 
and Hegel’s theories of retributive justice. Kant and Hegel believed that punishment is 
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principally intended to “annul wrong and thereby vindicate right” rather than to deter or to 
reform.311  This conception of punishment is based upon the lex talionis, the principle that 
criminals should be punished in equal measure to the crimes they committed.312 By asserting that 
retributive justice is a constitutional purpose of the death penalty, Powell echoes Kantian and 
Hegelian theories of punishment. The argument that the desire for retribution is a natural human 
reaction to violent crimes seems to affirm the validity of Nietzsche’s analysis of punishment as 
an instrument for exacting revenge. Nietzsche writes that members of society enjoy observing 
the state punishing criminals because this experience gives them “the pleasure of having the right 
to exercise power over the powerless.”313 Powell accepts this ruthless desire for revenge as an 
acceptable goal of capital punishment, and even argues that it is a natural human emotion; 
Nietzsche maintains that this justification is often used to defend retributive punishment.314 In 
my view, Powell’s discussion of the constitutionality and validity of retribution demonstrates 
that he is susceptible to the desire to punish that Nietzsche describes and Connolly later draws 
from. 
After Furman, several states adopted new legislation in order to ensure that the death 
penalty would not be applied in a capricious or discriminatory manner.315 Georgia, Texas, and 
twenty-three other states enacted laws requiring juries to consider aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances in sentencing, finding at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt 
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before imposing a death sentence.316 Georgia’s new laws also required a bifurcated trial, in 
which guilt or innocence is decided in the first stage and a sentence is determined in the second 
stage of the trial.317 Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the second case I will examine, deals with these 
new sentencing procedures. Under the Georgia legislation, Gregg was convicted of two counts of 
armed robbery and two counts of murder in a Georgia state court, and was sentenced to death in 
the second stage of a bifurcated trial by jury. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the 
convictions and sentence, and the Supreme Court of the United States granted cert.318 In a 7-2 
decision, the Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, finding that the imposition of the 
death penalty, both under the new Georgia legislation and in general, does not violate the 
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.319 Justice Stewart authored the opinion of the Court, which Justices Stevens and 
Powell joined. Justice White wrote a concurrence, which was joined by Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Blackmun also wrote a concurrence. Justices Brennan and 
Marshall both wrote dissents. 
The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Stewart, uses several arguments which 
intersect with the theories discussed in the first three chapters of this thesis, accepting some and 
rejecting others. Justice Stewart argues that the death penalty does not constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment, both in general and in the present case.320 Stewart examines the “evolving 
standards of decency” surrounding the death penalty, but unlike Reiman, who states that capital 
punishment should be abolished in accordance with the maturation of society, Stewart finds that 
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modern legislative support for capital punishment permits its application.321 He also rejects the 
Foucauldian argument that punishment should respect the dignity of the individual, maintaining 
that the state is not required to impose the least severe penalty possible.322 His discussion of 
retribution as a natural human desire seems to affirm Nietzsche’s discussion of punishment as a 
tool of revenge, while his dismissal of statistics demonstrating capital punishment’s lack of 
deterrent effects is similar to Van Den Haag’s reasoning.323 Finally, Stewart’s argument that 
capital punishment is an extreme penalty suitable for the most extreme crimes corresponds with 
Kant and Hegel’s adherence to the lex talionis.324 Justice Brennan also makes many arguments 
which align with theory in his dissent, but as it is thematically similar to his concurrence in 
Furman, I will not discuss his arguments further.325 
In the opinion of the Court, Justice Stewart addresses the petitioner’s argument that the 
death penalty, in all circumstances, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.326 He determines 
that it does not, and begins by examining the history of the proscription against cruel and unusual 
punishment within the Eighth Amendment. Although the principle was originally intended to 
prevent the use of torture, Stewart cites Weems v. United States (1910), in which the Court held 
that the Eighth Amendment should be “interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner” to extend 
to punishments society finds unacceptable in the future.327 Thus, Stewart examines contemporary 
viewpoints of the death penalty, looking at “objective indicia that reflect the public attitude 
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toward a given sanction.”328 Noting that both the framers and the authors of the Fourteenth 
Amendment accepted capital punishment, Stewart argues that “a large proportion of American 
society continues to regard it as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction.”329 This 
approval for the death penalty is clear both because a majority of states have enacted legislation 
that provides for the imposition of the death penalty, and because the jury, “a significant and 
reliable objective index of contemporary values,” is now heavily involved with sentencing.330 
Stewart’s assessment of the shifting standards of decency inherent in the Eighth Amendment 
leads him to conclude that the death penalty is still acceptable to contemporary society. 
Stewart next considers the argument that punishment should accord with the “dignity of 
man,” citing Trop v. Dulles and stating that punishment must not be excessive or severe in order 
to conform with the Eighth Amendment.331 Instead of discussing how the death penalty impacts 
human dignity, though, he maintains that because capital punishment is “selected by a 
democratically elected legislature against the constitutional measure,” the legislature is not 
required to select the least severe penalty possible for a particular crime.332 The legislature, 
Stewart asserts, is constitutionally prescribed to sentence criminals and represents the 
preferences of the demos, and is therefore given discretion in determining whether to impose 
capital punishment. Turning to retribution and deterrence, Stewart maintains that retribution is a 
constitutional purpose of punishment, as it is “an expression of society’s moral outrage at 
particularly offensive conduct,” and is acceptable because the objective state, rather than 
individual citizens seeking vindication, is responsible for punishment.333 Although statistics do 
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not demonstrate a link between capital punishment and deterrence, Stewart contends that this 
evidence is inconclusive, and states that the death penalty is an effective deterrent for some 
potential murderers, such as those who “carefully contemplate” whether to commit a crime.334 
Finally, Stewart argues that the death penalty is not disproportionate when applied to the crime 
of murder, as “it is an extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes.”335 Therefore, 
Stewart concludes, the death penalty does not violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The arguments Stewart uses in the opinion of the Court are analogous to many theories 
presented in the first three chapters of this thesis. Stewart’s discussion of the evolving standards 
implicit in the Eighth Amendment intersects with Reiman’s theory that overtly painful 
punishments should be abolished as “part of the civilizing mission of modern states.”336 
However, while Reiman argues that the death penalty should be abolished because it 
demonstrates society’s immorality, Stewart justifies the imposition of capital punishment 
through this analysis, arguing that the new legislation regulating sentencing demonstrates 
society’s acceptance of the penalty. Stewart also discusses the Foucauldian argument that 
punishment should respect human dignity; Foucault purports that punishment is a tool of power 
used to eliminate those society regards as irredeemable, and analyzes punishment by examining 
its context and practice.337 To Foucault, this practice of punishment implies that capital 
punishment, and all other definitive penalties, should be abolished, but Stewart dismisses this 
analysis, failing to discuss the severity of the practice of punishment in context and instead 
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justifying the death penalty by noting the constitutional power of the legislative branch. When 
discussing retribution, Stewart expresses the vengeful view of punishment that Nietzsche 
analyzes, assuming that the desire for revenge is a natural human emotion.338 While Stewart 
states that retribution as a purpose of punishment is acceptable because the unbiased state is 
responsible for imposing penalties, Nietzsche argues that society still experiences vengeful 
pleasure from witnessing their creditors being punished by the state.339 
When discussing deterrence, Stewart maintains that the death penalty effectively deters 
potential murderers despite an abundance of statistical evidence to the contrary. This argument is 
similar to Van Den Haag’s discussion of deterrence, in which the theorist dismisses statistical 
evidence and continually maintains that the death penalty potentially has some deterrent effect 
due to its severity.340 Van Den Haag does not discuss the possible deterrent effect of capital 
punishment for the rational criminal individual as Stewart does, but both ignore statistical 
evidence and advocate for the imposition of the death penalty based upon abstract theory. 
Stewart’s argument that the death penalty is a proportionately severe punishment for the severe 
crime of murder aligns with Kant and Hegel’s lex talionis principle. Like Kant and Hegel, 
Stewart does not advocate for exact adherence to the lex talionis, but maintains that the criminal 
who takes another’s life must be put to death himself.341 Throughout the opinion of the Court, 
Stewart accepts theoretical arguments similar to those of Kant, Hegel, and Van Den Haag, while 
rejecting the context-dependent analyses of Foucault and Nietzsche.  
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In McCleskey v. Kemp (1987), the Court considered whether evidence of racial 
discrimination in Georgia’s capital punishment sentencing indicated a violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Warren McCleskey, a black man, was convicted of murdering a white 
police officer during an armed robbery by a Georgia state court. During the second stage of a 
bifurcated trial, the jury found that two aggravating circumstances existed beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and sentenced McCleskey to death.342 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed 
the decision of the lower court, and the Supreme Court of the United States granted cert.343 
McCleskey used a statistical study known as the Baldus study to argue that the imposition of the 
death penalty in this case constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments because it was imposed in a racially discriminatory manner. The Baldus 
study demonstrates a “disparity in the imposition of the death sentence in Georgia based on the 
race of the murder victim and, to a lesser extent, the race of the defendant,” showing that black 
defendants charged with killing white victims were most likely to receive death sentences.344 In a 
5-4 decision, the Court ruled that the imposition of the death penalty in this case did not violate 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion, which Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O’Connor, and Scalia joined. Justices Brennan, Blackmun, 
and Stevens all wrote dissents, while Justice Marshall joined Brennan’s and Blackmun’s 
dissents. 
Both Justice Powell’s argument in the majority opinion and Justice Brennan’s dissent 
intersect with theories discussed in the first three chapters of this thesis. Powell argues that the 
imposition of capital punishment under Georgia legislation violates neither the Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection clause nor the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and 
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unusual punishment. He states that though the Baldus study may demonstrate discriminatory 
effects, there is no evidence to show that the Georgia legislature acted with discriminatory 
purpose when enacting its capital punishment statute. Further, he maintains that the discretion 
given juries when considering sentencing is constitutionally permissible and does not result in 
capricious or arbitrary application of the death penalty. By dismissing the discriminatory practice 
of capital punishment and focusing instead on the theoretical functionality of the Georgia capital 
punishment statutes, Powell ignores the Foucauldian examination of the practice of punishment 
and rejects analyses like Connolly’s, who states that punishment is used as a tool of revenge 
against outsiders, particularly African-Americans.345 In his dissent, Justice Brennan uses both the 
findings in the Baldus study and the discriminatory history of punishment in Georgia to argue 
that both the imposition of the death penalty in this case and the Georgia capital punishment 
statute violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Brennan’s argument analyzes 
punishment in a Foucauldian manner by examining both the history and the practice of 
punishment, and his discussion of the impact of race on punishment echoes Connolly’s 
examination of punishment as a tool of racism and revenge.346 
In the majority opinion, Powell argues that the Georgia capital punishment statute which 
sentenced McCleskey violates neither the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
nor the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment.347 In terms 
of McCleskey’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, Powell cites Whitus v. Georgia (1967) and Wayte 
v. United States (1985), in which the Court held that a defendant with an equal protection claim 
must prove “the existence of purposeful discrimination” and that this purposeful discrimination 
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“had a discriminatory effect” on him.348 Therefore, Powell maintains, in order to prevail on his 
equal protection claim, McCleskey must prove that the jury and judge who sentenced him to 
death acted with discriminatory intent.349 However, Powell believes that the statistics from the 
Baldus study are insufficient to prove discriminatory purpose. He states that because 
decisionmakers in sentencing are given broad discretion to make judgements, the Court 
“demands exceptionally clear proof before… [inferring] that the discretion has been abused;” the 
Baldus study does not provide this clear proof.350 Further, Powell argues that the Georgia 
legislature did not act with discriminatory intent in enacting the capital punishment statute, as the 
Baldus study demonstrated a discriminatory effect, not a discriminatory purpose. Proving the 
existence of a discriminatory purpose would “imply that the… state legislature selected or 
reaffirmed a particular course action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its 
adverse effects” on black defendants, and Powell contends that there is no evidence to suggest 
that this situation occurred.351 
Powell also rejects McCleskey’s claim that the Baldus study shows that the Georgia 
capital punishment legislation violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in 
the Eighth Amendment. He examines the “evolving standards of decency” which govern the 
application of the Eighth Amendment, and maintains that the legislature’s enactment of statutes 
providing for the imposition of capital punishment, as well as the jury’s willingness to impose 
such a sentence, indicates that the penalty is acceptable to contemporary society.352 Citing 
Furman, Powell states that a sentencing body’s discretion should be limited when determining 
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whether to apply capital punishment in order to prevent “arbitrary and capricious action.”353 The 
Georgia sentencing procedures appropriately limit the discretion of judges and juries, focusing 
on “the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual 
defendant” before imposing a punishment.354 Powell admits that the Baldus study demonstrates 
“some risk of racial prejudice influencing a jury's decision in a criminal case,” but argues that 
this risk does not rise to constitutionally unacceptable levels.355 Noting that state legislatures 
have endeavored to eliminate racial prejudice from sentencing procedures, Powell asserts that the 
“inherent lack of predictability” of individual jurors’ morals and decisions does not imply 
discriminatory sentencing, and concludes that racial discrepancies in sentencing are merely “an 
inevitable part of our criminal justice system.”356 
As Powell’s argument dismisses the context of the practice of punishment and rejects the 
possibility for racial discrimination in sentencing, his views are antithetical to Foucault’s and 
Connolly’s analyses of punishment. Foucault rejected the abstract, theoretical discussion of 
punishment, and instead examined the practice of punishment in order to answer the question, 
“how does one punish?”357 In his argument, Justice Powell dismisses the Baldus study because it 
does not clearly demonstrate a discriminatory purpose, ignoring the statistics that indicate that 
the practice of punishment is discriminatory. Therefore, by focusing on the provisions of the 
Georgia capital punishment statute rather than the statistical study which demonstrates its 
practical context, Powell rejects Foucauldian methods of examining punishment. By accepting 
the inevitability of racial discrepancies in the American criminal justice system, Powell also 
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makes an argument contrary to Connolly’s view of punishment. Connolly wrote that those with 
the power to impose punishment seek revenge against threatening agents, specifically young, 
African-American males.358 Instead of recognizing the avenues for judges and juries to exact this 
revenge through sentencing, Powell argues that this broad discretion will not lead to racial 
discrimination. The findings of the Baldus study demonstrates that the discretion given judges 
and juries has already had discriminatory effects, but Powell ignores this context.  
 Justice Brennan begins his dissent by stating that the death penalty is, in all 
circumstances, cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.359 However, he maintains that even if he did not hold this belief, McCleskey’s 
death sentence was imposed in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.360 Brennan 
cites Furman, in which the Court held that the death penalty “may not be imposed under 
sentencing procedures that create a substantial risk that the punishment will be inflicted in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner.”361 Therefore, defendants challenging their death sentences 
have been required to show a substantial risk of discrimination rather than conclusively prove 
that “impermissible considerations have actually infected sentencing decisions.”362 Brennan 
asserts that the discriminatory effects of the Georgia capital punishment statute reveal a risk of 
racial discrimination that is “intolerable by any imaginable standard.”363 This discrimination is 
especially egregious due to the finality of capital punishment.364 Brennan then details the history 
of racial discrimination and punishment in Georgia, demonstrating that until the 20th century, the 
criminal justice system “expressly differentiated between crimes committed by and against 
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blacks and whites.”365 This historical demonstration, Brennan contends, continues to impact the 
implication of capital punishment in the present.366 
 In direct contrast to Powell’s argument in the majority opinion, Brennan argues that the 
discretion given prosecutors, judges, and jurors under the Georgia capital punishment statute 
allows for racial discrimination in sentencing. Under the statute’s provisions, jurors are not given 
a list of aggravating and mitigating factors, nor are they given a standard to balance them against 
one another.367 Therefore, the capital punishment statute creates opportunities for racial bias, 
“however subtle and unconscious,” to influence whether defendants are sentenced to life in 
prison or to death.368 The purpose of discretion in sentencing, Brennan maintains, allows juries to 
each defendant as a “unique human being,” but allowing race to play a role in sentencing 
decisions “[assesses] the worth of human beings according to color, insensitive to whatever 
qualities the individuals in question may possess.”369 Brennan asserts that the validity of the 
Baldus study lies in the fact that it is “not speculative or theoretical… [but] empirical,” and states 
that discretion in the Georgia statute has resulted this racial discrimination.370 He concludes that 
despite the state’s many endeavors to eliminate racial discrimination in its justice system, 
America has not “completely escaped the grip of a historical legacy spanning centuries,” and that 
the Georgia capital punishment statutes is cruel and unusual due to its discriminatory effects.371 
In his dissent, Brennan examines punishment in a manner which aligns with both 
Connolly’s and Foucault’s analyses of punishment. Brennan’s discussion of the subtle effects of 
racial discrimination on punishment makes his argument comparable to Connolly’s analysis of 
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punishment as a tool of revenge against African-American defendants. Connolly writes that 
punishment provides a legal avenue for individuals to seek revenge against threatening agents, 
particularly African-Americans.372 In arguing that the discretion given judges and juries in 
allows subtle racist attitudes to influence sentencing, Brennan makes an argument that is 
analogous to Connolly’s. Unlike Connolly, however, Brennan does not discuss the 
socioeconomic circumstances which cause young, African-American males to resist the white, 
middle-class ideal by engaging in criminal behavior, an analysis essential to understanding 
Connolly’s strategies for creating a more just system of punishment.373 Brennan also analyzes 
punishment in a Foucauldian manner by rejecting the theoretical arguments of the majority and 
focusing on the empirical, context-dependent Baldus study, which reveals discrimination in the 
practice of punishment. Foucault emphasized the importance of examining the history of 
punishment to understand the contemporary practice of punishment, and utilized this method in 
Discipline and Punish when discussing the shifts in the purpose of punishment in France.374 
Brennan thus uses Foucauldian methods in detailing the history of punishment in Georgia, and 
examining how it has affected the discriminatory practice of punishment in the present case.  
After the Furman decision, the Court ruled to narrow the application of the death penalty 
in several cases. One such case is Ford v. Wainwright (1986), in which the Court examined the 
constitutionality of executing the insane. Alvin Ford was convicted of murder and sentenced to 
death by a Florida state court in 1974. In 1982, his mental health began to deteriorate, and a 
panel of psychologists appointed by the Governor of Florida concluded that he suffered from a 
mental disorder resembling paranoid schizophrenia, though he did understand the nature and 
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effects of the death penalty.375 When the Governor signed a death warrant for Ford in 1984, his 
attorneys subsequently appealed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida, seeking an evidentiary hearing to evaluate Ford’s sanity. The District Court denied the 
request for the hearing, and the Eleventh Circuit Court affirmed this decision.376 The Supreme 
Court of the United States granted cert, and, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the execution of the insane.377 Justice Marshall authored the majority opinion, which 
Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens joined. Justice Powell wrote a concurrence, 
while Justice O’Connor wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which Justice 
White joined. Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissent, which Chief Justice Burger joined.  
Justice Marshall’s argument in the majority opinion aligns with theories discussed in the 
first three chapters of this thesis, while Justice Rehnquist’s dissent is divergent with Foucauldian 
theory. Marshall utilizes both a historical analysis of punishment and an assessment of 
contemporary values to argue that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the insane. 
He also maintains that the provisions of the Florida procedure for evaluating a defendant’s 
competency violate the Eighth Amendment because under the procedure, the ultimate decision 
rests with the executive and the prisoner is unable to submit relevant information. Marshall 
therefore uses Foucauldian methods when examining the history of executing the insane and 
when evaluating the practice of punishment under Florida legislation.378  He also utilizes 
Reiman’s theory that excessively severe punishments should be abolished for the advancement 
of society, and Kant and Hegel’s theory that retributive punishment serves no purpose when 
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imposed upon the insane.379380 In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argues that the Florida 
competency procedure is constitutional because it is in keeping with the historical precedent that 
the majority cites. This argument uses historical analysis in a flawed manner, utilizing one 
historical tradition to justify modern punishment without analyzing and connecting the two. 
Therefore, Rehnquist’s dissent is divergent from Foucault’s method of historical analysis.381 
Further, Rehnquist’s assertion that the executive has the right to determine death sentences 
rejects Foucault’s criticism of the modern state’s power to kill its citizens.382 
In the majority opinion, Marshall begins by examining the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment, asserting that the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment extends to 
“both the procedural and the substantive” aspects of punishment.383 The Court has recognized 
that the ban on cruel and unusual punishment evolves along with the views of society, and 
therefore “takes into account evidence of contemporary values” before deeming a punishment 
unconstitutional.384 Marshall then begins a brief historical analysis on the legal view of executing 
the insane, stating that “the practice consistently has been branded “savage and inhuman.””385 
Both the English common law and the early American justice system refused to apply the death 
penalty to the insane, and this rejection extends to contemporary views of punishment, as no 
state sanctions the execution of the insane.386 Marshall then notes historical and contemporary 
criticisms of this practice of punishment; one essential criticism states that executing the insane 
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serves no retributive purpose, as the insane “has no comprehension of why he has been singled 
out and stripped of his fundamental right to life.”387 Therefore, Marshall concludes that the 
execution of the insane violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment, 
both “to protect the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of understanding,” and “to 
protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance.” 
Marshall then evaluates the constitutionality of Florida’s procedure for evaluating 
competency, ultimately deeming it unconstitutional. He maintains that Ford was entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing to determine his competency, and points to several aspects of the Florida 
competency laws he views as violative of the Eighth Amendment.388 First, Marshall takes issue 
with the procedure’s “failure to include the prisoner in the truth-seeking process.”389 The 
procedure does not allow any evidence relevant to the competency evaluation to be submitted by 
the prisoner or his counsel; Marshall posits that this makes the procedure inadequate.390 Second, 
Marshall criticizes the procedure’s “denial of any opportunity to challenge or impeach the state-
appointed psychiatrists’ opinions.”391 This aspect of the procedure means that each expert’s 
evaluations are accepted as fact, rather than being questioned and challenged to eliminate bias.392 
Third, Marshall critiques “the State’s placement of the decision wholly within the executive 
branch.” Under the Florida legislation, the Governor both appoints the psychologists who 
perform the evaluation and makes the ultimate decision whether to execute the prisoner. Further, 
“his subordinates have been responsible for initiating every stage of the prosecution of the 
condemned from arrest through sentencing,” meaning that he lacks neutrality and holds an 
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unbalanced amount of power.393 Due to the defects in the Florida competency procedure, 
Marshall deems it unconstitutional.394 
In terms of theoretical arguments, Marshall’s arguments in the majority opinion align 
with Foucauldian methods of evaluating punishment. Foucault maintained that one must 
demonstrate the flaws within “falsely-self evident” punishment by illustrating its connection with 
“a multiplicity of historical practices.”395 By tracing the historical view of executing the insane 
and connecting it with contemporary critiques, Marshall utilizes a Foucauldian analysis. Though 
Marshall’s examination of the long-standing rejection of executing the insane affirms a norm of 
punishment rather than rejecting it, I believe that his historical analysis is in keeping with 
Foucault’s methods. Marshall also uses Foucault’s method of analyzing the practices of 
punishment when critiquing several aspects of the Florida sentencing procedures, as he indicates 
the potential injustices and abuses of power inherent in the law.396 When discussing the evolution 
of the Eighth Amendment along with society’s standards, Marshall also makes an argument 
similar to Reiman’s theory. Reiman states that especially severe punishments, such as the death 
penalty, should be abolished in order to further civilization.397 Though Marshall does not argue 
for the complete abolition of the death penalty, he maintains that execution of the insane is 
unconstitutional partially because society views it as an inhumane punishment. Finally, 
Marshall’s assertion that executing the insane does not serve any retributive purpose aligns with 
Kant and Hegel’s theory of retributive justice. As Conrad interprets their theory, Kant and Hegel 
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believed that retributive justice should not be imposed upon the insane, as these individuals do 
not understand the immorality of their crimes and are incapable of rational choice.398  
In Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, he critiques Marshall’s argument in the majority opinion, 
arguing that both the execution of the insane and Florida’s competency procedures do not violate 
the Eighth Amendment. He states that Marshall’s historical analysis and examination of the 
contemporary rejection of executing the insane is erroneous. According to Rehnquist, Florida’s 
competency laws are “fully consistent with the “common-law heritage” and current practice on 
which the Court purports to rely.”399 Rehnquist examines one aspect of history, stating that “at 
common law it was the executive who passed upon the sanity of the condemned;” therefore, in 
making the Governor the final arbiter of a prisoner’s competency, Florida’s procedure adheres to 
historical tradition.400 Further, as contemporary state statutes often leave the final determination 
of insanity to the executive, the “evolving standards of decency” inherent in the Eighth 
Amendment actually imply that Florida’s procedure is constitutional.401 Therefore, Rehnquist 
asserts that Florida’s competency procedures are constitutional, because in giving the executive 
the power to determine competency, they are “faithful to both traditional and modern 
practice.”402 Rehnquist also speculates that granting prisoners the right to a competency hearing 
could allow them to advance false insanity claims, and argues that the majority opinion seeks to 
“[create] a constitutional right that no State seeks to violate.”403 
By citing historical precedent to rebut Marshall’s argument, Justice Rehnquist appears to 
analyze punishment in a Foucauldian manner. However, as Foucault maintained that the 
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historical analysis of punishment demonstrates the connection between contemporary 
punishment and “a multiplicity of historical practices,” Rehnquist’s method is not 
Foucauldian.404 Instead of examining the connections between historical and modern penalties in 
order to challenge and reexamine norms of punishment, Rehnquist cites an isolated historical 
tradition to justify an accepted mode of punishment. As Rehnquist maintains that the executive 
should be the arbiter of competency while ignoring the possibilities for injustice inherent within 
Florida’s competency procedures, he also ignores the practice of punishment, another point of 
difference with Foucault’s context-dependent method of analysis. Further, by asserting that the 
executive should possess the power to determine competency, and therefore the power to control 
and take the lives of its citizens, Rehnquist presents an argument contradictory to Foucauldian 
analysis. Foucault criticizes the sovereign’s power to kill his citizens in the modern bio-political 
state, and therefore would certainly contest Rehnquist’s defense of this executive power.405  
Another case in which the Court narrowed the application of the death penalty is Atkins v. 
Virginia (2002), when it ruled that the execution of the intellectually disabled violates the Eighth 
Amendment and is therefore unconstitutional. Daryl Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed 
robbery, and murder, and was sentenced to death in a Virginia state court after a jury found two 
aggravating factors during the penalty phase of the bifurcated trial.406 During the penalty phase, a 
forensic psychologist testifying for the defense concluded that Atkins was “mildly mentally 
retarded” based upon a series of interviews and a standard intelligence test.407 On appeal, the 
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of the death penalty, and the Supreme Court of 
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the United States granted cert.408 In a 6-3 decision, the Court ruled that the execution of the 
intellectually disabled is unconstitutional. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, which 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
wrote a dissent, which Justices Scalia and Thomas joined, and Scalia also wrote a dissent, which 
Rehnquist and Thomas joined. 
Both Justice Stevens’ argument in the majority opinion and Justice Scalia’s dissent use 
reasoning that intersects with the theories discussed in the first three chapters of this thesis. 
Stevens asserts that the execution of the intellectually disabled violates the ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment, both due to the national consensus against it and 
because it does not serve the penological purposes of retribution and deterrence. He thus uses an 
argument similar to Reiman’s theory that excessively severe punishments should be reduced to 
serve the advancement of civilization, and also utilizes Foucauldian methods when discussing 
the practice of the execution of individuals with intellectual disabilities.409 When discussing 
retribution and deterrence, Stevens makes arguments similar to Kant and Hegel’s theory of 
retributive justice, which states that only the rational, responsible individual should be subjected 
to retributive punishment, and to Conrad’s discussion of deterrence, which asserts that only the 
rational criminal will be deterred by capital punishment.410 In his dissent, Scalia argues that the 
imposition of the death penalty upon the intellectually disabled is constitutional because there is 
no true national consensus against it. Scalia appears to use Foucauldian methods when 
examining the history of the execution of intellectually disabled individuals, but does not use this 
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historical context to challenge accepted norms of punishment, as Foucault advocated.411 When 
maintaining that executing intellectually disabled individuals accomplishes deterrence, Scalia 
also uses arguments similar to Van Den Haag’s theories.  
In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens begins by discussing the “evolving standards of 
decency” inherent in the Eighth Amendment. He cites Weems v. United States (1910), in which 
the Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment prohibits “excessive” sanctions, meaning that 
penalties for crimes should be proportionate to these offenses.412 In order to evaluate the modern 
consensus on the execution of the intellectually disabled, Stevens examines contemporary 
legislation, which he views as the “clearest and most reliable objective evidence” of 
contemporary values.413 Stevens begins by examining the ruling in Penry v. Lynaugh (1989), in 
which the Court affirmed the constitutionality of executing mentally disabled individuals. In that 
case, the Court determined that no national consensus against the execution of the intellectually 
disabled existed, and therefore imposing capital punishment upon these individuals was 
consistent with “evolving standards of decency.”414 However, since that decision, 18 states 
enacted legislation specifically prohibiting the execution of the intellectually disabled.415 Stevens 
contends that these new laws represent a “[consistent] direction of change.”416 Further, each state 
legislature voted overwhelmingly to enact the laws, and even in states which still allow the 
execution of the intellectually disabled, the practice is uncommon, as only 5 such executions 
have occurred since Penry.417 Stewart thus asserts that this national consensus demonstrates that 
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“society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average 
criminal.”418 
Stevens then discusses the relationship between the execution of the intellectually 
disabled and the penological purposes of retribution and deterrence, concluding that these 
purposes are not met. According to the Court’s ruling in Gregg, capital punishment must serve 
the purposes of retribution and deterrence in order to be deemed constitutional.419 In terms of 
retribution, the execution of the intellectually disabled individual does not serve this purpose 
because of this individual’s limited responsibility for his crime. Stewart states that society’s 
consensus against the execution of intellectually disabled individuals “reflects widespread 
judgement about the relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders;” though these 
individuals can typically differentiate between right and wrong, their ability to engage in logical 
reasoning and to control their impulses is limited.420 In order to ensure that “only the most 
deserving of execution are put to death,” the intellectually disabled should not be subjected to 
capital punishment.421 In terms of deterrence, Stewart echoes the Court’s previous jurisprudence 
in maintaining that only those individuals whose crimes are premeditated and deliberated are 
deterred by the threat of capital punishment. As intellectually disabled individuals are 
cognitively limited, they are unlikely to be able to “process the information of the possibility of 
execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that information.”422 
Therefore, due to the national consensus of state legislatures and because executing the 
intellectually disabled does not serve either retribution or deterrence, Stevens concludes that the 
imposition of the death penalty upon these individuals is unconstitutional. 
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In the majority opinion, Stevens uses many arguments which align with the theories 
discussed in the first three chapters of this thesis. In arguing that the national consensus against 
the execution of the intellectually disabled necessitates the abolition of this penalty, Stevens 
makes an argument analogous to Reiman’s theory. Reiman argued that excessively severe 
punishments should be abolished as “part of the civilizing mission of modern states,” and by 
asserting that the imposition of punishment should shift with society’s values, Stevens makes a 
similar argument, though he does not advocate for the abolition of capital punishment in all 
circumstances as Reiman does.423 When discussing the new legislation reflecting a national 
consensus against the execution of the intellectually disabled, Stewart analyzes punishment in a 
Foucauldian manner by examining the practice of punishment, especially when indicating the 
reluctance of any state to impose this penalty.424 Stewart’s assertion that executing the 
intellectually disabled does not serve retributive purposes because these individuals are not 
culpable for their crimes is similar to Kant and Hegel’s argument that retributive punishment 
should only be applied to rational individuals who can comprehend the gravity of their actions.425 
Finally, Stewart’s argument that executing the intellectually disabled will not deter potential 
criminals aligns with Conrad’s theory that only those who rationally consider the consequences 
of their crimes will be deterred by the threat of capital punishment.426 
 Justice Scalia structures his dissent as a direct response to Justice Steven’s arguments in 
the majority opinion. Therefore, he turns first to the “evolving standards of decency” inherent in 
the Eighth Amendment, concluding that there is actually no national consensus against execution 
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of intellectually disabled individuals. He examines the national attitude regarding the execution 
of the intellectually disabled at the time of the ratification of the Eighth Amendment, stating that 
“only the severely or profoundly mentally retarded… enjoyed any special status under the law at 
that time.”427 Scalia then critiques Stewart’s discussion of a “national consensus” against the 
execution of the intellectually disabled, stating that the 18 states which recently adopted 
legislation banning the practice make up less than half of the 38 states that permit capital 
punishment.428 Further, the legislation that Stewart bases his argument on is “still in its infancy,” 
meaning that these states cannot yet discern the long term functioning of their new laws.429 
Scalia also rejects Stewart’s assertion that the infrequency with which intellectually disabled 
people are executed implies a “national consensus.”430 He posits that the true reasons why states 
impose this penalty so infrequently is that the intellectually disabled “comprise a tiny fraction of 
society” and that intellectual disability is a mitigating factor used during sentencing.431 
Therefore, Scalia asserts that the execution of the intellectually disabled is rejected “neither by 
the moral sentiments originally enshrined in the Eighth Amendment… nor even by the current 
moral sentiments of the American people.”432 
 Scalia then addresses the majority’s arguments regarding retribution and deterrence. In 
terms of retribution, he argues that “deservedness of the most severe retribution” depends upon 
the depravity of a criminal act in addition to the criminal’s mental capacity.433 He states that the 
fact that some juries continue to impose capital punishment upon intellectually disabled 
individuals reveals that “society’s moral outrage sometimes demands execution of retarded 
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offenders.”434 In terms of deterrence, Scalia asserts that the majority’s argument does not state 
that all individuals with intellectual disabilities are undeterred by the threat of execution. Instead, 
these individuals are simply less likely to be deterred. Therefore, Scalia maintains that “the 
deterrent effect of a penalty is adequately vindicated if it successfully deters many, but not all, of 
the target class.”435 If some intellectually disabled individuals can still be deterred by the threat 
of the death penalty, it should be applied to these individuals. Scalia concludes his dissent by 
critiquing the Court’s recent narrowing of the application of capital punishment, stating that 
these exceptions to the penalty’s application “[did not exist] when the Eighth Amendment was 
adopted,” nor are they “supported by current moral consensus.”436 
 Justice Scalia’s dissent intersects with several of the theories discussed in the first three 
chapters of this thesis. In diminishing the significance of the 18 states which enacted legislation 
banning execution of the intellectually disabled while ignoring the fact that 12 other states had 
completely proscribed capital punishment, Scalia rejects Foucauldian methods of analyzing 
punishment, which emphasize a context-dependent analysis. Foucault’s method of analyzing 
punishment necessitates the examination of “practices,” and Scalia dismisses the practice of 
capital punishment applied to the intellectually disabled when he ignores the reluctance of all 
states to continue executing these individuals.437 Though Scalia examines historical perspectives 
on executing intellectually disabled individuals, he does not use this historical analysis to critique 
“falsely self-evident” norms of punishment as Foucault did.438 In fact, Scalia endorses the 
continuation of accepted norms of punishment when critiquing the Court’s narrowing of the 
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application of the death penalty. When discussing deterrence, Scalia uses a justification similar 
to Van Den Haag’s theory. Van Den Haag theorized that the death penalty accomplishes 
deterrence, and stated that even if it does not, society should “risk the possible ineffectiveness of 
executions” because it will lead to a net gain in lives saved.439 Similarly, Scalia endorses the 
execution of the intellectually disabled while relying on a tenuous assumption that some 
individuals may be deterred by this threat. Lastly, Scalia’s assertion that “society’s moral 
outrage” requires the execution of some intellectually disabled individuals seems to demonstrate 
the validity of Nietzsche’s analysis of punishment as a tool of revenge.440 After analyzing which 
theories the Supreme Court accepts, and which they reject, I will now be able to determine the 
Court’s theoretical view of the death penalty, and its implications for the future of capital 
punishment in the United States. 
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Conclusion 
 In this thesis, I have outlined the major theories underpinning capital punishment in the 
United States and explored their connections with significant Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
Therefore, I am now able to discern the Supreme Court’s theoretical view of the death penalty 
and its potential impact on the future of capital punishment in the United States. The theories 
which critique or defend capital punishment in the United States can be divided into two 
discernable groups. First, theorists like Kant, Hegel, and Van Den Haag, who examine capital 
punishment in terms of retribution and deterrence, utilize philosophical, context-independent 
theories. Second, theorists like Nietzsche, Foucault, and Connolly analyze the death penalty in 
terms of its practice, exploring the purpose of punishment as a tool of revenge and racism, and 
challenging accepted norms of punishment. Significant Supreme Court jurisprudence on capital 
punishment mirrors this division; justices who support capital punishment typically utilize the 
theories in the first group, while justices who critique capital punishment typically use the 
methods of the second group. If the use of the death penalty in the United States is eradicated, it 
will occur in one of two ways. Either the Supreme Court will narrow the application of the 
penalty until it is no longer imposed, or the Court will rule the punishment unconstitutional in all 
circumstances. I believe that the second circumstance must occur in order to enable our society 
to challenge norms of punishment, and that to do so, context-dependent analyses of punishment 
must be employed.  
 In the first two chapters of this thesis, I examined context-independent, theoretical 
defenses and critiques of the death penalty, which evaluate capital punishment in terms of 
retributive justice and deterrence. Kant and Hegel’s theories of justice posit that offenders should 
be punished according to the lex talionis, or the principle that criminals should be penalized in 
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proportion to the severity of their crimes. The lex talionis implies that murderers should be 
executed for their crimes if they are capable of rational choice.441 Reiman concedes that 
adherence to the lex talionis and the use of capital punishment accomplishes retributive 
punishment, but argues that especially severe punishments, including the death penalty, should 
be abolished for the advancement and maturation of society.442 Although statistics demonstrate 
that the death penalty does not accomplish deterrence, Van Den Haag maintains that the death 
penalty should be applied to convicted criminals in order to potentially save the lives of future 
murder victims.443 Conrad responds to this argument by asserting that only rational individuals 
will be deterred by the threat of capital punishment, and as criminals are typically driven by 
impulses and passions, the death penalty has no deterrent effect.444 These arguments typically 
evaluate the death penalty from a purely theoretical standpoint, dismissing or ignoring details 
about the practice of punishment. Therefore, arguments using these theories are often unable to 
effectively critique the American death penalty.  
 In contrast, the analyses of punishment discussed in the third chapter are based upon the 
practice of punishment in context. These analyses, articulated by Nietzsche, Foucault, and 
Connolly, are often based upon historical views on punishment, and seek to reevaluate 
punishment by revealing its inconsistencies and unjust purposes. Nietzsche traces the purpose of 
punishment beginning with the relationship between the creditor and debtor, and asserts that 
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punishment functions as a tool of revenge which individuals gain pleasure from witnessing.445 
Foucault’s method of analyzing punishment examines the historical purposes of punishment and 
the practice of modern punishment. He uses this context-dependent analysis to critique the use of 
any definitive penalties, including capital punishment and life sentences.446 Connolly 
incorporates Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s conceptions of punishment to argue that punishment is a 
tool of revenge used by white, middle-class individuals against the impoverished African-
Americans whose existence calls into question their superior identities.447 These analyses provide 
more effective critiques of the death penalty because they focus on the ways in which 
punishment is applied and used to accomplish a variety of purposes.  
 Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning capital punishment has followed a trend 
of questioning the constitutionality of the punishment in general or narrowing the penalty’s 
application. In Furman v. Georgia (1972), the Court examined both the arbitrary imposition of 
capital punishment and the constitutionality of the death penalty on its face, while in Gregg v. 
Georgia (1976), the Court ruled that the imposition of the death penalty, both in a bifurcated trial 
and in general, does not violate the Eighth Amendment.448 In McCleskey v. Kemp (1987), the 
Court evaluated the death penalty’s constitutionality amidst evidence of racial discrimination in 
its application, and ultimately ruled that the imposition of capital punishment in this case is 
constitutional.449 In Ford v. Wainwright (1986), Atkins v. Virginia (2002), and several other cases 
not discussed in this thesis, the Court narrowed the application of the death penalty, ruling that it 
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cannot be applied to the insane or to the intellectually disabled.450 The opinions, concurrences, 
and dissents in these cases utilize several theoretical arguments. In general, opinions affirming 
the constitutionality of the death penalty utilize philosophical theories while rejecting context-
dependent analyses, while opinions positing that the application of the death penalty is 
unconstitutional, either in a particular situation or on its face, rely upon context-dependent 
analyses and the contemporary practice of punishment.  
 In the cases I analyzed, opinions affirming the constitutionality of the death penalty 
accepted philosophical theories while rejected context-dependent analyses. Both Justice Powell’s 
dissent in Furman and Justice Stewart’s majority opinion in Gregg argue that the death penalty is 
an extreme punishment suitable for the most extreme crimes, and therefore adhere to Kant and 
Hegel’s theory of the lex talionis. Powell’s and Stewart’s arguments in these two cases also 
demonstrate the validity of Nietzsche’s theory of punishment as a tool of vengeance, as both 
justices assert that the desire for revenge through punishment is a natural human tendency. 
Stewart’s arguments in Gregg and Justice Scalia’s dissent in Atkins are similar to Van Den 
Haag’s theory of deterrence, as both justices dismiss evidence demonstrating that the death 
penalty fails to accomplish deterrence and advocate for the imposition of the penalty because it 
could potentially deter future criminals. Justice Powell’s argument in the majority opinion of 
McCleskey asserts that the provisions of the Georgia capital punishment legislation is 
constitutional while ignoring the racially discriminatory practice of that legislation, meaning that 
he rejects both Connolly’s theory of punishment as a tool of racism and revenge and Foucault’s 
method of analyzing the practice of punishment rather than relying upon theories. Both Justice 
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Rehnquist’s dissent in Ford and Scalia’s dissent in Atkins use historical examples to justify the 
imposition of capital punishment, but both justices fail to connect these examples with 
contemporary practices and do not use this analysis to challenge norms of punishment, meaning 
that they reject Foucauldian analysis. Lastly, Rehnquist’s dissent in Ford maintains that the 
executive should be the final arbiter of competency, and therefore possesses the power to take 
the lives of citizens, in direct contrast with Foucault’s critique of the state’s sovereign power 
over the lives of its citizens. 
 Conversely, opinions critiquing the application of the death penalty in certain scenarios 
rely mainly upon context-dependent analyses of punishment. All of these opinions assert that the 
Eighth Amendment must be evaluated according to “evolving standards of decency,” aligning 
with Reiman’s theory that excessively painful punishments should be abolished to advance the 
civilization and maturation of society. Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens make similar 
theoretical arguments in the majority opinions of Ford and Atkins, maintaining that the death 
penalty should not be applied to the insane or the intellectually disabled because these 
individuals do not engage in rational thought when committing crimes. These arguments are 
similar to Kant and Hegel’s theories of retributive justice, in which both theorists maintained that 
retributive punishment should not be applied to those who are unable to engage in rational 
thought and thus are not wholly responsible for their crimes. Justice Douglas’ concurrence in 
Furman and Justice Brennan’s dissent in McCleskey both evaluate the discriminatory implication 
of the death penalty in a way similar to Connolly’s analysis of punishment. Further, Brennan’s 
dissent in McCleskey, Marshall’s argument in Ford, and Stevens’ argument in Atkins all use 
Foucauldian methods by examining both the history and the contemporary practice of 
punishment. Only Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Furman maintains that capital punishment is 
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unconstitutional in all circumstances, and Brennan utilizes Foucauldian methods in this 
concurrence. Brennan argues that the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment because it 
does not comport with human dignity, an assertion which aligns with Foucault’s analysis of 
punishment. Foucault states that some criminals are viewed as irredeemable monsters who 
cannot be rehabilitated unless sentenced to death or to life in prison; in arguing that the practice 
of punishment should respect the dignity of the individual, I find that Brennan makes a 
Foucauldian argument.   
 Therefore, because Supreme Court decisions narrowing capital punishment or arguing for 
its complete abolition use context-dependent analyses, I find that these analyses are crucial to 
eliminating the death penalty in the United States. After examining Supreme Court jurisprudence 
on the death penalty, I believe that the American death penalty can be abolished in one of two 
ways: either by gradually narrowing the punishment until it is no longer applied, or by ruling that 
the punishment is cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment in all 
circumstances. Given the theoretical framework of the Supreme Court’s previous death penalty 
jurisprudence, I believe that the second scenario is more likely to lead to a more just system of 
punishment. If the Supreme Court ever makes such a ruling, I believe that Foucauldian, context-
dependent methods of analysis will be crucial in this decision. Such a ruling might rely upon 
Foucault’s critique of the sovereign state’s power to take away the lives of its citizens, and his 
assertion that capital punishment essentially deprives individuals of their humanity, portraying 
them as monsters who can never be redeemed or brought back into society.451 A Supreme Court 
decision abolishing capital punishment based upon these theories is likely to provoke the 
reevaluation of all norms of American punishment, whereas a decision narrowing the death 
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penalty based upon the general will leaves the remainder of the system of punishment intact. 
Though a ruling of this type is not the only way to eradicate capital punishment in the United 
States, it may lead to the creation of a more just system of American punishment. 
 However, eliminating the death penalty while leaving the rest of America’s system of 
punishment intact will do little to challenge norms of punishment and establish a more just 
system. Foucault asserts that abolishing the death penalty while continuing to sentence offenders 
to life in prison “maintains, in one form or another, the category of individuals to be definitively 
eliminated.”452 I believe that the practice of sentencing individuals to definitive sentences, 
whether execution or life in prison, should be reevaluated both because it gives the state total 
control over an individuals’ life and because it treats individuals convicted of crimes as 
disposable and irredeemable. Further, I argue that the circumstances which produce criminal 
behavior should be addressed and rectified in order to make American punishment more just. 
Despite the Court’s ruling in McCleskey, capital punishment is still applied most frequently to 
individuals convicted of murdering white victims, revealing that racially discriminatory attitudes 
continue to influence the American justice system. Connolly argues that white elites define 
minorities, especially African-Americans, as “a racially marked constituency whose demands 
foreclose otherwise viable possibilities,” which may cause these individuals to engage in 
criminal behavior to resist and transcend their circumstances.453 Therefore, the state could 
eliminate some criminal activity and refrain from applying punishment by seeking to affect the 
discriminatory attitudes and social circumstances which lead minorities to commit crimes. 
Abolishing the American death penalty is the first step towards a more just system of 
punishment, but I find that a thorough reevaluation of the entire system is necessary. In his 
                                                
452 Michel Foucault, “Against Replacement Penalties,” in Power, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: The New Press, 
2000), 461.  
453 William Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 56. 
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concurrence in Furman, Justice Brennan cites Weems v. United States (1910), in which the Court 
held that abolishing capital punishment could lead to “hope… for the reformation of the 
criminal.”454 Eliminating the death penalty and continuing to reevaluate norms of punishment 
using context-dependent theory could reduce the state’s sovereign power to end the lives of its 
citizens and produce a justice system that reforms rather than penalizes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
454 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), 306. 
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